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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
Statement of the Problem 
Sociologists and a host of other social scientists periodically 
rediscover poverty in the United States. Specifically, the nation in 
the early I960's once again centered its attention on "poverty," the 
"poor," and the "disadvantaged." The existence of poverty was clearly 
demonstrated with substantial portions of the poor being aged, under-
educated, and nonwhite (Harrington, 1963). Ameliorative actions through 
the "war on poverty" formed the major strategy of governmental intervention 
into poverty neighborhoods and communities (Miller, 1968). Governmental 
intervention into the area of poverty was translated into action systems 
by factoring major actions into operating activities. One of the efforts 
generated to combat poverty was the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan 
Development Act which created the Model Cities Program. The purpose of 
this program was set out in the CDA Letter Number lOB (1970): 
The purpose of this title is to provide additional financial 
and technical assistance to enable cities of all sizes (with 
equal regard to the problems of small as well as large cities) 
to plan, develop, and carry out locally prepared and scheduled 
comprehensive city demonstration programs containing new and 
imaginative proposals to rebuild or revitalize large slum and 
blighted areas; to expand housing, job, and income opportuni­
ties; to reduce dependence on welfare payments; to improve edu­
cational facilities and programs; to combat disease and ill 
health; to reduce the incidence of crime and delinquency; to 
enhance recreational and cultural opportunities; to establish 
better access between home and jobs; and generally to improve 
living conditions for the people who live in such areas, and 
to accomplish these objectives through the most effective and 
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economical concentration and coordination of Federal, State and 
local public and private efforts to improve the quality of 
urban life. 
Local city demonstration agencies were authorized to design service 
delivery systems for their respective communities. Cities that received 
model cities funding were allowed to develop tailor-made programs to meet 
their specific problem areas (i.e., housing, employment, social services, 
health care, etc.). Explicit stipulations in administrating the monies 
allocated through the model cities program required programs to be (1) 
coordinated, (2) comprehensive, (3) concentrated, and (4) offer citizen 
participation. 
The administrative theory and policy in federal intervention 
strategies under model cities utilized a system approach. That is, the 
various agencies (i.e. public, private, voluntary, etc.) were linked in 
a systems relationship calculated to maximize the community resources 
toward a comprehensive attack upon poverty; agencies were linked by con­
tract in the community action field, which, because of their special 
attributes, relied for coordination upon the network of contractual re­
lationships, comprehensive information and public liaison systems, and 
a function of strategic control (Shipman, 1971). The framers of the 
poverty programs assumed that participation of the poor in the activities 
and programs affecting their lives would have instrumental and sdcio-
psychological results over and above the benefits of an improved service 
delivery system (Zurcher, 1970a). Moynihan (1965) suggested that the im­
pact of participation in poverty programs would be instrumental in the 
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sense that members of the poor united in social action would provide the 
political and strategic leverage necessary to open closed opportunity 
structures. However, the implications of coalition politics, interest 
group conflicts, and racial factionalism were not adequately resolved in 
the federal intervention approach to poverty (Peterson, 1970; Capps, 1970; 
Lowenstein, 1971). 
Governmental intervention into poverty areas focused on the community, 
individual neighborhoods, and on the individual. The focus of analysis in 
community and other formal organizations may center on three distinct areas 
as outlined by Blau (1974:112-113): 
The focus of analysis can be (1) the individual in his 
specific role as a member of the organization who occupies 
a certain position; (2) the structure of social relations 
among individuals in the various groups within the organi­
zation; or (3) the system of interrelated elements that 
characterizes the organization as a whole. 
The focus of this dissertation is on the structure of social relations 
among individual citizen board representatives in a community development 
organization. Thus, the unit of analysis falls into the first and second 
categories that Blau (1974) delineates. By analyzing the social relations 
among individual citizen representatives of the local community develop­
ment organization, we have attempted to explain and predict the domain 
upon which members disagree. Here, domain refers to the organizational 
field or area that citizen representatives stake out for themselves and 
constituents in terms of program resources and citizen participation. 
Arnstein (1969) noted that the question of citizen participation by the 
poor in poverty programs has been a major issue of political contention. 
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The domains in the community action and model cities agencies emerged out 
of tension and conflict in the mid-sixties. Individuals and groups 
through confrontation politics pressured their way into an already highly 
organized field. In many instances, the domain that one group of indi­
viduals had established for themselves conflicted and threatened the 
domain of a similar group of individuals (Warren, ££ al., 1974). 
Modifications in the model cities program under Planned Variations 
Demonstration was a source of tensions and conflicts in a number of Planned 
Variation cities (Urban Management Consultants, 1972). The Planned Vari­
ations Demonstration was designed to "demonstrate — the validity of the 
principles that when local governments are given the opportunity and re­
sources, they can and will manage their affairs effectively and in a way 
that is responsive to all their citizens" (Urban Management Consultants, 
1972). 
The research study of Richards and Goudy (1971) focused on two 
segments of the Des Moines' Model Cities Program: citizen participation 
and interagency coordination. The goals of the research study were to 
"systematically analyze the interorganization relations established to 
bring about institutional change in the Model Cities Area" and to "pro­
vide systematic analysis of citizen participation in the Model Cities 
Program" (Richards and Goudy, 1971:2). The current research focuses on 
individual citizen representatives in the expanded Model Cities Program 
(Planned Variation's Community Development Program). Citizen representa­
tion on the poverty boards was expanded from 19 under Model Cities to 
over 120 members under the Community Development Program. 
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The bringing together of community representatives from diverse 
neighborhoods and socioeconomic backgrounds into a coalition form of 
participation presents an excellent opportunity to test city-wide, as 
opposed to neighborhood mechanism of involvement. As a result of the 
limited amount of federal funds allocated to each Planned Variations 
city, the functionally-oriented citizen advisory representatives sponsored 
by Model Cities and Planned Variations has become one major source of con­
flict (Urban Management Consultants, 1972). Specifically, conflicts 
were resultant of several interdependent factors: (1) the manner in 
which resources or funds were allocated across target areas, and (2) 
the perceived role of citizens in the planning and decision-making 
processes. The role of citizen participation was also found to be a key 
issue in community action, poverty boards, and model city agencies 
(Zurcher, 1970a; Van Til and Van Til, 1970; Capps, 1970; Richards and 
Goudy, 1971). 
The different emphases placed upon the objectives of participation 
and resources allocation continue to be a source of friction and turmoil 
in community decision organizations (Warren, e£ al., 1974). The inclu­
sion of diverse segments of the poor into a coalition with the non-poor 
presents a perplexing paradox: participation by low-income residents in 
federal poverty programs legitimates such programs while at the same time 
generates suspicions among residents of being "coopted" by the system. 
The dilemma was highlighted by a former chairman of the Central Advisory 
Board of the Des Moines' Community Development Program in an interview 
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conducted by Loretta Benz (1974). In his own words, the former citizen 
board chairman asserts: 
The main problem with citizen participation comes when the 
power structure in the city isolates those who are viewed as 
"potential influentials" in the community, and manipulates them 
to think their way. . . . Citizen participation is a myth. It 
takes the people and make them part of the systez. Black leader­
ship in Des Moines is determined by the white power structure. 
Leadership should not be concentrated in any one person. It makes 
him too vulnerable to being absorbed by the System. . . . The 
last effective citizen participation was during the riots. 
An evaluation of city-wide participation in Planned Variations 
revealed that citizen representatives protested proposed mergers of local 
citizen groups. Specifically, the Urban Management Consultants (1972:42) 
state: 
The development of a city-wide citizen participation 
structure may subordinate and reduce the power of the exist­
ing structure in the original Model neighborhood. Fear of 
this development plus lack of input and participation in 
Planned Variations matters have caused protests by Model 
Neighboorhood citizen groups in about 50 percent of the full 
variation cities. 
The severity of the protests has varied with the 
circumstances. In a few cases, the original Model Neigh­
borhood citizen groups were concerned with control over the 
distribution of jobs in their neighborhoods. In other cases, 
however, the original group was threatened by a proposal that 
it be merged into a city-wide group. Under these circumstances, 
the new city-wide group would exercise all the powers and func­
tions of the existing group in the original Model Neighborhood 
as well as the other neighborhoods of the city. 
Participants in community action programs bring to such programs 
the beliefs and values that have been inculcated in them through sociali­
zation and social interaction. The belief systems of individuals do not 
always coincide, and often run counter to one another. For instance. 
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social conflicts may arise when individual participants have different 
definitions as to the causes of poverty, its remediation, and strategy to 
be employed in combatting poverty (Banfield, 1968; Free and Cantril, 1967; 
Clark and Hopkins, 1959; Lowenstein, 1971; LeGates and Morgan, 1973). 
Silberman (1968:81) contends that organizations that have broadly based 
membership may find it difficult to arrive at a consensus on politically 
volatile issues- That is, racially and ethnically heterogeneous citizen 
boards or membership body may prevent innovation in that the maintenance 
or fragile coalitions consumes a considerable amount of the members 
energies. Peterson (1970) suggests that conflict is greatest in community 
organizations where racial factionalism is apparent and where black and 
white members oppose each other over the allocation of scarce resources. 
As stated earlier, this dissertation focuses on the citizen 
representatives in a community development organization as the unit of 
analysis. In an earlier investigation of participation in the Des Moines' 
Model Cities Program of Richards and Goudy (1971), there appears to have 
been little interest in presenting the social conflicts among citizen 
board representatives from the Model Neighborhood. Community boards and 
citizen groups were initiated through the upheavels in the cities and were 
a type of "riot insurance" (Seligman, 1968). The interplay among citizen 
representatives in the poverty programs may be considered in terms of the 
dimensions of differences between competing or conflicting parties. Glenn 
£t (1970) suggest that social conflicts may be of two types: a con­
flict of interest and a conflict of understanding. Sternberg (1972:193) 
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asserts that there is an inherent conflict between the poor's involvement 
and the middle-class values of bureaucrats, the objectives of the merit 
system, and the traditional principles of hierarchy and professionalism 
found in American administrative thought and policy. 
Finally, the sociological problem under investigation in this 
dissertation may be succinctly stated in the following two questions: 
1. What type of social relations do individuals structure in a 
heterogeneous (i.e., racial and socioeconomic status) community 
development citizen board? 
2. What factors contribute to domain conflict among citizen 
representatives in a city-wide community development program? 
Heterogeneity refers to the degree to which members of the citizen 
board are alike or different in terms of such characteristics as race and 
socioeconomic status. Blau (1974) asserts that the make-up of a member­
ship group can affect the mode that the group selects for pursuit of its 
goal and interests. That is, individuals who are members of an organiza­
tion where the membership is drawn from different racial and socioeconomic 
groups may find it difficult to find modes to accommodate diverse and 
sometimes competing segments. 
The problem of domain conflict is especially relevant to this study 
in that individual members of the citizen board represent six constituent 
"target areas" or neighborhoods as opposed to one Model Neighborhood under 
the original Des Moines Cities Program observed by Richards and Goudy 
(1971). By focusing on the individual citizen representative and the 
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social relations that emerge from interaction, it should be possible for 
us to improve the understanding of domain conflict in a city-wide com­
munity decision board. A scrutiny of the conceptual and research litera­
ture found on existing models of community decision boards do not make an 
adequate presentation of social conflict. 
In light of the above discussion of the sociological problem under 
investigation, a number of research objectives were formulated. They are: 
1. To develop and test a model of domain conflict among citizen 
representatives in a community development board. 
2. To test and delineate more clearly the relationships between key 
explanatory concepts or variables (i.e., institutionalized thought 
structure, interaction, voluntary association membership, social 
class, and ascribed status) and the key explained concept or 
variable of domain conflict. 
3. To gain more insight into the issues surrounding lower class and 
minority group member (e.g.. Black) participation in community 
and other voluntary associations. 
4. To delineate some of the policy implications of city-wide citizen 
participation structures. 
5. To develop an indicator of domain conflict which reflects both 
the material as well as ideological nature of the concept. 
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CHAPTER II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Introduction 
It is commonly agreed that theory is not independent of research, 
but is a complementary element in social research (Merton, 1957). Theory 
has been defined by Sjoberg and Nett (1968) as a logically interrelated set 
of propositions or statements that are empirically meaningful. Wallace 
(1971:57) identified two consequences of theory: (1) Theories can explain 
known empirical generalizations, and (2) theories can predict empirical 
generalizations that are still unknown. The social phenomena that is 
being predicted or explained is referred to as the explained concept, 
while the factors which determine or contribute to the exploration and pre­
diction of social phenomena are the explanatory concepts (Wallace, 1971; 
Dubin, 1969) . In the process of theory building, Dubin (1969) suggests 
that the concepts of explanatory and explained variables provides a more 
precise presentation of the causal imagery in the social world than the 
use of the terms independent and dependent variables. 
The conceptualization of variables in this study has followed the 
lead of Dubin (1969) in specifying explanatory and explained variables. 
The initial discussion covers the conceptualization and rationale for the 
explained variable, domain conflict. Attention turns next to a review of 
literature and past theory and research relevant to domain conflict. The 
discussion then takes up the causal relations among the explanatory vari­
ables and the explained variables. Finally, elements of the causal model 
are presented in a single theoretical framework. 
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The Explained Variable 
Domain conflicts 
The concepts of domain and domain conflict are inçortant in 
understanding and predicting behavior of individuals in organizations 
(Levine and White, 1961; Warren, 1974a). Much attention has been focused 
on domain consensus. Levine and White (1961:1191) defined domain consen­
sus as the degree to which there is agreement regarding the area that is 
to be covered by a group or organization. For this reason, domain consen­
sus was posted as an important condition by which allocation of resources 
may take place. However, domain conflict also plays an important part in 
resource allocation. Kriesberg (1973) defined domain conflict in terms 
of the wide range of interest and beliefs in which individuals disagree. 
Glenn e_t (1970) defined domain conflict as the degree to which there 
is disagreement over scarce resources and epistemologies• 
Domain conflict is useful for describing the relationships that 
develop between organizations as well as those that develop between in­
dividuals. In the case of this study, domain conflict becomes increasingly 
inçortant in predicting and understanding the relationships that individu­
als as citizens' representatives establish in community development pro­
grams. Domain is a useful concept for defining the laws in which indi­
viduals compete for scarce resources. Participants in community develop­
ment programs may share common goals but may disagree on how to attain the 
shared goals. Thus, disagreement over resource allocation is a key issue 
in poverty intervention programs (Kramer, 1969; Peterson, 1970; Lowenstein, 
1971; Warren, e£ al., 1974). 
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In this study, domain conflict was defined in terms of the disagree­
ment that citizen representative had toward organizational goals. That 
is, domain conflict is posited as being in the mind of the individual 
representative in regard to the goals that had been delineated by the 
local general purpose and federal government. The perceptions of the 
citizen representatives were used as an indication of the level of agree­
ment or disagreement with the participation and programmatic goals of 
the local community development program. As citizen representatives 
have the ability to become aware of their interests and to organize 
themselves into a conflict group, the prediction and explanation of 
domain conflict have implications for both social theory and social policy 
in urban reform. 
In outlining the elements of domain conflict, Glenn _e£ a^. (1970) 
assert that conflicts are of two types: conflict of interest and conflict 
of understanding. Conflict of interest involves disagreement over material 
resources, while conflict of understanding represents disagreement over 
ideologies. 
The idea of individuals conçeting for scarce resources and holding 
contrasting epistemologies is consistent with Dahrendorfs discussion of 
the basis for "imperatively coordinated associations." Dahrendorf (1959) 
viewed imperatively coordinated associations as representing distinguish­
able clusters of relationships where individuals have the ability to be­
come aware of their interests and to organize themselves into a conflict 
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group- Lenski (1966:30) also addressed this point of interest 
articulation : 
When men are confronted with important decisions where they 
are obliged to choose between their own, or their group's in­
terest, and the interests of others, they nearly always choose 
the former—though often seeking to hide this fact from them­
selves and others. 
For Zechmeister and Druckman (1973)» conflict of interest stems from dif­
ferences between individuals in their preferred distribution of some scarce 
resources. Policies affecting resource allocation may have differential 
impact on citizen board members who are representatives of constituent 
groups. For instance, citizen members who represent a neighborhood where 
there is inadequate social services in human resource-type services may 
have this as their top priority. On the other hand, other citizen members 
may represent a neighborhood where social service and "welfare" are low 
priority services. For them, street sewers and other physical-construc­
tion type programs are rated as top priority. Thus, conflicts may develop 
between advocates of "social service" and advocates of "bricks and mortar" 
services. Such competing interests are often incompatible as poverty pro­
grams operate under limited budgets. Thus, individuals who get the least 
of the program resources inevitably feel contradictory incentives: the 
citizen representative may corroly with the way resources are allocated, 
or resist the allocation process on the grounds that it yields inequitable 
results (Edelman, 1975). 
In contrast to the conflict of interest, conflicts of understanding 
are couched in divergent epistemologies (Glenn, £t , 1970). In the 
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context of this study, conflict of understanding is conceptualized as 
divergence in norms and goals for citizen participation in governance. 
For instance, representation of contrasting or competing ideologies toward 
citizen participation by low-income residents in federally funded poverty 
programs has been predicted, and shown, to have implications for domain 
conflict (Warren, e^al., 1974; Peterson, 1970; Kramer, 1969; Amstein, 
1969). Much controversy and misunderstanding have followed the imple­
mentation of citizen participation mechanisms (e.g., program components 
for involving low-income residents in poverty programs). A number of 
studies have shown that the interpretations of the degree and kind of 
participation by the poor engendered dramatic conflicts, particularly 
concerning representation, selection process, and decision-making power 
of citizen representatives on the policy formulating and advisory boards 
(Klein, 1964; Knoll and Whitcover, 1965; Cloward, 1965; Carter, 1966, 
Zurcher, 1970b; Peterson, 1970; Warren, 1974b). 
Numerous studies have discussed the conflict of understanding 
component of domain conflict in community development programs (Amstein, 
1969; Van Til and Van Til, 1970; Capps, 1970; Warren, e;t al* » 1974; 
Richards and Goudy, 1973). Client and grassroots participation forms of 
involvement emerge from the literature. Richards and Goudy (1973) suggest 
that client participation is empirically demonstratable, while grassroots 
participation is more ideological in nature. 
This shift from neighborhood-based citizen participation mechanisms 
to city-wide mechanisms has significant implications for domain conflicts 
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among the various citizen representatives and neighborhood interest 
groups (Urban Management Consultants, 1972:41). Warren e^ (1974:114) 
allude to some of these implications involved in the dynamics of citizen 
participation: 
Citizen action, whose primary concern is the needs and 
wishes of low-income citizens, constitutes a force moving in the 
direction of an adversary role for citizen participation, primary 
innovation, and to the extent that it is not attenuated, conflict 
and eventual repelling. Citizen involvement, concerned pri­
marily with preserving agency rationale and validity. . . is 
a force opposing the dynamics of citizen action. 
The involvement of "target area residents" in policy and decision 
making can only occur indirectly through actions of its representatives. 
Conflicts over formal representation may develop as competing factors 
within poverty programs seek arrangements facilitating the development of 
their constituent's interests and ideas (Peterson, 1970; Lowenstein, 1971). 
A conceptual illustration of domain conflict is presented in Figure 
2.1. Two levels of abstraction are included in the diagram: (1) general 
or theoretical level, and (2) sub-theoretical level. Domain conflict has 
been analytically divided into two sub-theoretical level concepts: con­
flict of interest and conflict of understanding (Glenn, e^ , 1970). 
Past empirical research has focused on either conflict of interest or on 
the conflict of understanding. At present, it seems no attempt has been 
made to integrate the two components of domain conflict into a general 
model which captures the diversity of meaning of domain conflict. 
A conceptual composition of conflict of interest and understanding 
may prove useful in understanding and predicting the dynamics involved in 
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(General) Domain Conflict 
(Sub-Theoretical) 
Conflict of Interest Conflict of Understanding 
N 
Conflict of 
Interest-Understanding Composite 
Figure 2.1. A conceptual diagram of domain conflict and levels of 
abstractions. Dashed lines indicate inferred contribution 
of individual component of domain conflict into a composite 
sub-concept. 
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poverty intervention programs, and urban reform. Thus, a composite concept 
is needed for presenting a holistic approach to the understanding of do­
main conflict. Explication and measurement of the composite of the domain 
conflict concept is presented in Chapter III. 
Although the number of federal community development programs have 
been reduced since their initiation during the mid-sixties, resource al­
location and citizen participation continue to be salient issues in urban 
reform (Warren, £t ad., 1974). In addition, as resources become more 
scarce through federal "cut-backs" and "phase-out" of funding and citizen 
participation requirements, domain conflict among citizen representatives 
and other interest groups concerned with poverty intervention are expected 
to increase. A study of domain conflict among citizen representatives in 
a community development program seemed to be a topic worthy of research. 
Thus, development of a causal model of domain conflict will allow for 
greater understanding, explanation, and prediction of conflicts between 
community development organization members. The key explanatory variables 
in the causal model are presented in the next section of this chapter. 
Explanatory Variables 
The purpose of this section is to outline key concepts that explain 
the variable domain conflict. Each explanatory variable is defined and 
past theory and research literature is specified in developing its bi-
variate causal relationship to domain conflict. Five major causal factors 
are distilled from the literature as helpful to explain the amount of 
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domain conflict that may emerge. These five factors are: (1) institu­
tionalized thought structure, (2) interaction, (3) voluntary association 
membership, (4) social class, and (5) ascribed status. 
A major goal of this study is the development of a causal model of 
domain conflict. Following the discussion of the relationship between 
each explanatory variable and the explained variables, the relationships 
between the explanatory variables are described as they are introduced 
into a causal model. The sequential introduction of explanatory variables 
into the causal model is as follows: (1) institutionalized thought struc­
ture, (2) interaction, (3) voluntary association membership, (4) social 
class, and (5) ascribed status. The sociological logic of the sequence 
with which the variables are introduced into the model will be explicated 
in the course of describing the theoretical model. 
Institutionalized thought structure 
As a theoretical concept institutionalized thought structure has its 
roots in the sociology of knowledge. Mannheim (1936) specified several 
thought structures that individuals may develop in relation to their 
social environment. Mannheim (1936:198) suggested that the individual's 
thought structure falls on a continuum of conservative and liberal-humani­
tarian mentalities. 
Individuals who have liberal-humanitarian institutionalized thought 
structures take on the role of "reformers" and change agents. In a sense, 
the visionary schema is "utopian" in that emphasis is placed on the norma­
tive, the critical evaluation of the existing order, and the impetus for 
19 
social change. On the other hand, individuals whose institutionalized 
structure is conservative are intent on maintaining the status quo (Man­
nheim, 1935:194). 
The strata of individuals who represents the social and intellectual 
order experiences as reality that structure of relationships of which they 
are the bearer; while other individuals that are in opposition to that 
order will be oriented toward changing the status quo. Mannheim (1936:199) 
insisted that the relationships between Utopian (e.g., liberal-humanitarian 
mentality) and the existing order are dialectical in nature. 
The institutionalized thought structures which developed during the 
mobilization of concerns and actions about the poor have engendered domain 
conflicts (Clark and Hopkins, 1961; Kriesberg, 1973; Warren et al., 1974). 
Efforts that have been undertaken to ameliorate poverty at the individual 
and structural level have not come about without the presence of competing 
ideologies and interests (Marris and Rein, 1967). Community resident, 
citizen representatives, and community development staff persons were 
faced with the dilemma of placing priority on goals to rehabilitate the 
poor, or whether to focus attention on the process of decision-making 
through citizen participation as a goal to be accomplished (Kramer, 1969). 
The institutionalized thought structure within community development pro­
grams has been found to be an important factor in the structuring of 
social relationships and the operation of federal poverty programs. War­
ren, et al. (1974:20) defined institutionalized thought structure as the 
framework for addressing social problems and the mode through which be­
havior among individuals take place and is interpreted. 
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Institutionalized thought structure in this dissertation refers to 
the combination of ways of thinking about social and economic problems and 
the methods of instigating social change. Included in the institutionalized 
thought structure is the belief-value system for addressing the various 
problems that citizen representatives have established as priorities. 
Clark and Hopkins (1969:19) addressed the issue of diverse thought 
structures in community development programs. For them, social change as 
a goal in the various community programs may take on the thought structure 
of the "Puritan" ideal, the "Good Samaritan," or the "New Deal." The domi­
nant thought structure in the Puritan ideal conforms to the conservative 
imagery of poverty and social change. Poverty is assumed to be a resul­
tant of a lack of personal or moral fiber within the individual. Thus, 
this orientation posits that it would be better to withhold assistance to 
the poor than weaken the fiber of those who have already succeeded. The 
Good Samaritan thought structure is also conservative in its strategy for 
reform and social change. Here, assumptions are posited which present 
the poor as tragically weak, incapable of helping themselves, and as vic­
tims of inescapable tragic circumstances. 
A somewhat radical departure from both the Puritan and Good Samari­
tan thought structures is the New Deal thought structure. This thought 
structure. New Deal, is consistent with the liberal-humanitarian men­
tality as posited by Mannheim (1936). The New Deal thought structure is 
grounded on the assumption that poverty and unjust conditions exist in 
neighborhoods, communities, and even in society as a result of the rich 
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exploiting the poor. Individuals that take this position as their dominant 
thought structure set out to "upset" the status quo and to assert their 
"rights" (Clark and Hopkins, 1969:20-21). 
Racial hostilities and tensions in the mid-sixties to a large measure 
played an important part in developing the strategy and dominant thought 
structures on poverty programs. Community development programs were es­
tablished with a variety of latent and manifest goals in mind. Raab (1968) 
suggests that strategies which were employed in civil rights movements were 
transferred to the economics of resource allocation and re-distribution. 
Community development programs which were developed to combat poverty also 
served as a means for minority and low-income residents to gain access to 
political and decision-making processes (Miller, 1965; Moynihan, 1965; Har­
mon, 1970: Zurcher, 1970b; Warren, ^  al•, 1974; Richards and Gaudy, 1973). 
Most studies on community citizen groups and organizations indicate 
that to a greater or lesser extent, they "shook up" local governments of 
power, at least temporarily, by fostering "politicization" of the poor and 
disenfranchised (Kramer, 1969). However, many, and perhaps most, of the 
federal poverty programs (i.e., urban renewal, community action programs, 
model cities, planned variations, and revenue sharing) all appear to 
solidly strengthen the prevailing or traditional arrangements of resource 
distribution and existing spheres of influence (Rossi and Dentier, 1961; 
Lowi, 1969; Graves, 1972; Chatman, 1972; Zimmerman, 1972; Walton, 1973). 
Conservative institutionalized thought structure in poverty programs 
buttresses the established service delivery systems, while the liberal 
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institutionalized thought structure threatens the ideas of consensus and 
universality, challenges the motives and intentions of non-poor partici­
pants, and increases the likelihood of domain conflict (Capps, 1970). 
Arnstein (1969:216) has asserted that conservative thought structures in 
community action organizations empahsize service operations, while the 
more liberal structures emphasize the political aspects in terms of how 
resources are allocated and patronage and contracts are parceled out. 
Domain conflicts are more numerous in those community programs where the 
liberal institutionalized thought structure is the prevailing norm. 
Sternberg (1972:193) has concluded that there was a built-in conflict be­
tween the poor's involvement and the thought structures of bureaucrats, 
the objectives of the merit system, and the traditional principles of 
hierarchy which is found in American administrative thought and policy. 
In sum, the institutionalized thought structure has been specified 
in terms of conservative-liberal, and puritan-new deal orientations 
(Mannheim, 1936; Clark and Hopkins, 1969). Community development pro­
gram participants who have liberal institutionalized thought structures 
tend to see an urban development plan emerging not as just the product of 
neutral professional persons (e.g., planners), but as the result of the 
clash of values and interests of self-seeking individuals, groups, and 
organization (Lowenstein, 1971:290). Based on the above discussion, the 
relationship between institutionalized thought structure and domain con­
flict is posited in the following general hypothesis (G.H.): 
G.H.I: The more liberal the institutionalized thought structure, 
the greater the domain conflict. 
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Interaction 
Much of the social interaction of modern urban-industrial society is 
carried out through formally organized associations in which the prevailing 
pattern of social organization is bureaucracy. Although government, mili­
tary, and industrial organizations come closest to being "pure" bureau­
cracies as described by Weber (1958) , elements of bureaucratic organiza­
tion can be found in community development programs. Community groups, 
committees, and appointed and elected citizen representatives are formed 
for the specific purpose of making decisions and formulating policies with­
in larger organizational structures (e.g., community development 
organizations). 
The importance of interaction in directing the ongoing activity of 
an organization was clearly demonstrated by Blau (1974). In any organi­
zation, each person brings to the field his own attitudes, prejudices, 
and other personality characteristics that lead him to play his assigned 
role in ways not prescribed by its designers. As a resultant of recur­
rent interaction, each individual develops feelings of like or dislike, 
of loyalty or distrust, for other members of the organization. In ad­
dition, the primary loyalties and personal interests may seem more im­
portant to a representative than the goals of a large impersonal organi­
zation, or the interests of competing members (Blau, 1974). 
Interaction in this study is defined as the intra-group contact 
which may occur between citizen representatives in a community develop­
ment program. Interaction among community development citizen 
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representatives usually takes place within the context of smaller groups, 
each with its own characteristic pattern of interpersonal relationships 
(Zurcher, 1970). For instance, interactions between citizen representa­
tives may be informal and relatively intimate. In other cases, interac­
tion may be more formal, ritualistic, and impersonal. 
The goals of decision-making representatives are typically concerned 
with policy making, allocation of resources, distribution of rewards, 
approval of proposals, and other similar issues surrounding poverty 
intervention. A small group's decision can be of considerable importance 
to the members of the larger group it serves or to the other members with 
whom they are associated. In the case of community development programs, 
the arenas in which members interact often generate power struggles and 
competive maneuvering. Interaction in such settings can be extremely 
subtle, as members attempt to influence each other and to promote decisions 
that will favor their special interests (Kramer, 1969; Lowenstein, 1971; 
Warren, 1974). The extent to which members interact to a large degree 
affects the program's locus including its manifest goals and the channel 
of access to maintenance resources (Warren, e^ , 1974). 
Warren, e^ a^. (1974) suggest that citizen representatives in 
community development organizations interact with each other on the basis 
of their needs for scarce resources. Conflict over organization domain 
places representatives in the position of defending against competitors 
who would usurp their constituents' service field and degree of autonomy. 
Formal and informal interaction among representatives serve the dual pur­
pose of making constituents aware of salient issues and serve as an arena 
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for mapping out strategies to counter competing groups or individuals. 
For instance, it is likely that citizen representatives who are consis­
tently absent from community development meetings would have few oppor­
tunities of advancing their respective constituent group's interest in 
the formal structure of the community organization. In addition, inter­
action through "strategy sessions" sets the arena for interaction in the 
formal meeting setting. Here, strategy sessions refer to the impromptu 
meeting caucuses that members hold before the regular meeting. In other 
words, strategy sessions lay the groundwork on which representatives op­
erate in the organization's domain. 
From the above theoretical discussion of the two components of 
interaction, it was shown that both formal and informal interactions are 
important in structuring of strategies employed in community development 
programs. As an aid in understanding and predicting domain conflicts, 
both formal and informal interactions agmong citizen representatives must 
be considered. The formal interaction provides the "legitimate" arena 
for voicing grievances and interests, while the informal interaction pro­
vides opportunities for outlining strategies or "homework" for the more 
formal organization meeting setting. Formal and informal interactions are 
posited as having equally significant impacts upon domain conflict. Thus, 
a conceptual composite of these two components would allow for a better 
understanding of interaction as a whole as it relates to domain conflict. 
Marris and Rein (1967) concluded that the patterns of interaction 
largely determines the level of conflicts (e.g., need for scarce resources. 
26 
and specialized interests). That is, greater levels of interaction is 
likely to lead to domain conflicts among participants in poverty programs. 
Based on the above discussion, the relationship between interaction and 
domain conflict was formulated in the following general hypothesis: 
G-H.2: The greater the interaction, then the greater the 
domain conflict. 
The relationship between interaction and institutionalized thought 
structure 
Interactions among individuals in an organization are not likely to 
take place unless at least some members have objectives that cannot be 
met with available or internally accessible resources. Thus, the strategy 
of coalitions politics becomes an important element among an organization 
membership (Capps, 1970). 
City-wide poverty programs have fostered interaction among individuals 
who represent divergent ideologies and interests. In this case, citizen 
representatives establish an interdependence with other representatives 
for the need of such resources as money, specialized skills, and access to 
policy and decision-making. The extent to which representatives concen­
trate their dependence on other members for acquiring scarce resources and 
for addressing their constituent interests and priorities are influenced 
by the coalitions that emerge among members (Kramer, 1969; Department of 
Housing and Urban Development, 1969; Harmon, 1970). Peterson (1970) has 
suggested that citizen representatives interact with each other in terms 
of furthering their respective interest and ideologies. 
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Interaction through board meetings, committees, and task forces are 
arenas where citizen representatives can present their views on program 
operations, resource allocation, budgeting priorities, and the overall 
philosophy of the poverty program efforts. Lowenstein (1971) has sug­
gested that interaction among representatives on poverty boards "poli­
ticizes" the members in that planning is viewed as a political process. 
The "politicization" of the poor and disenfranchised was a major consequence 
of interaction in the federally funded poverty programs (Kramer, 1969; 
Lowi, 1969; Walton, 1973; Warren, 1974b). 
Interaction by citizen representatives in community development 
programs also provides an arena for members to evaluate the impact of 
federal programs in the "target areas." Zurcher(1970a) has suggested that 
high level of interaction among citizen representatives allows members to 
achieve a greater self-expression in articulating the needs of their con­
stituents. Peterson (1970) asserts that the most prolific producers of 
demands for "radical" change come from citizen group where there is high 
interaction among the members. Based on the above discussion, the rela­
tionship between interaction and institutionalized thought structures can 
be stated as: 
G.H.3: The greater the interaction, then the more liberal 
the institutionalized thought structure. 
The relationship between voluntary association membership and domain 
conflict 
The United States has been described as a "nation of joiners," and a 
country of high voluntary association membership (Babchuk and Booth, 1969) . 
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In this study voluntary association membership was defined as participation 
in community organizations and/or activities which are external to the 
local community development program on which citizen representatives serve. 
Numerous studies have been conducted on membership and participation 
in federal poverty programs, community organizations, and other voluntary 
associations (Moynihan, 1965; Miller, 1968; Zurcher, 1969; 1970a; Wright 
and Hyman, 1971). Participation in a wide range of voluntary associations 
has been found to decrease the likelihood of domain conflict in community 
organizations. Peterson (1970) has suggested that citizen representatives 
who are involved in multiple organizations have more "universalistic" 
perspectives of poverty action strategies, while non-participants are 
seen as presenting a more "particulistic" idea of community action. That 
is, individuals who are members of community action programs, but do not 
have ties to outside organizations, are more likely to engage in domain 
conflicts than individuals who have multiple membership in outside 
organizations. 
Based on the above discussion of voluntary association membership, 
it is posited that membership in a wide range of outside voluntary associ­
ations decreases the likelihood of domain conflicts among citizen repre­
sentatives. The general hypothesis formulated in the above discussion is 
as follows: 
G.H.4: The greater the voluntary association membership, 
the less the domain conflict. 
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The relationship between voluntary association membership and interaction 
Harp and Gagan (1971) have suggested that organizations or groups 
which have inclusive goals and broader membership base will result in 
greater interaction of its members. When different forms of social par­
ticipation are generated by basically the same interests, an individual 
may be inclined to pursue more than one source of activity (Tomeh, 1974). 
On the other hand, when different types of voluntary association activity 
fulfill different needs, an individual may find that a choice has to be 
made in confining himself to some one activity. 
Citizen representatives who are not members of a wide range of 
voluntary associations, or who do not have allegiance? to outside groups, 
often confine their activity and effort to interaction within the com­
munity development program. Thus, interaction is more intense for mem­
bers who are non-participants in voluntary association than members who 
are active in outside organizations. 
Based on the above discussion, it is posited that membership in a 
wide range of voluntary associations is likely to decrease interaction 
among members in a community development program. The general hypothe­
sis formulated from the above discussion is as follows: 
G.H.5: The greater the voluntary association membership, 
then the less the interaction. 
Social class 
The Marxian definition of social class involves a contest for 
influence, the exercise of power, and the redefinition of authority. 
For Marx, social classes are clearly discrete population categories. 
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They are collectivities which may have a common culture or be homogeneous 
demographically, but their essence is that they are identifiable people 
(Marx and Engels, 1905). Dahrendorf (1959) asserts that the identifia-
bility of members of social classes lie in their understanding of social 
organization, hence in their views of the locus of authority. A class 
system based principally on power inqualities has been posited by a num­
ber of authors (Lynd and Lynd, 1929; Hollingshead, 1949; Mills, 1956). The 
two-class system described by the Lynds has its line of demarcation based 
on the ways in which people "get a living." Mills (1956) described three 
institutional hierarchies in American society; the economy, the political 
order, and the military establishment. Mills (1956:11) states: 
The people of the higher circles may be conceived as the 
members of a top social stratum. . . . The elite. . . feel 
themselves to be, and are felt by others to be, the inner 
circle of the 'upper social classes.' They form a more or 
less compact social and psychological entity; they have be­
come self-conscious members of a social class. 
Mill's (1956) conception of elite centers around status groups 
forming a social entity or social class. Following the lead of Mills 
(1956), social class is viewed as social stratification based on status. 
An individual's status is seen in terms of his relations to the means of 
production (e.g., occupation, education, income, etc.). A person's status 
imposes upon the individual certain attitudes, values, and interests re­
lating to the political and economic sphere. Differentiation between the 
various classes is often made on a social basis: (1) the subjects dif­
ferentiated are members of a social aggregate, and (2) the ideas of the 
statuses and criteria applied to the members of the aggregate are usually 
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socially derived. Therefore, social class is primarily concerned with 
the acquisition of goods and property and the achievement of a level of 
living usually referred to as one's socioeconomic status. 
Social class is especially relevant in any discussion of theory and 
policy involved in federal poverty intervention. That is, the major policy 
and decisions regarding federal and local allocation of poverty funds were 
based on "poverty thresholds" and specific concentrations of lower class 
individuals and families (Urban Management Consultants, 1972). In the 
initial development of the "war on poverty" and "Great Society" programs, 
the representatives of the poor and lower class citizens did not articu- s 
late the views and issues which were relevant for residents of the 
federally designated "target areas." The interests of lower class 
citizen representatives were not the same as that of middle-class or non-
poor citizen representatives on certain controversial issues, such as wel­
fare, education, employment and income maintenance. Kramer (1969) has 
asserted that the initial controversy over "maximum feasible participation" 
of the poor was actually a political struggle between public officials and 
middle-class "self-proclaimed representatives" of the poor. 
The inclusion of lower-class and minority persons on local poverty 
boards and committees was a way of preventing segregation and broadening 
the base of the federal community action programs (Levitan, 1968:273). In 
many instances, citizen boards were composed of public officials, private 
agencies and residents from low-income "target areas." However, repre­
sentatives of the poor were not necessarily poor themselves. In addition, 
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there was no design or plan to incorporate the poor as a controlling 
component of the decision-making body (Wofford, 1971:80). Representatives 
on community decision boards were either elected by target area residents 
or appointed by local government officials. Silberman (1968) argues that 
local governmental officials fear the policy-formulation of the poor, 
minority group individuals, and agencies that represent the poor. 
Peterson (1970) contends that as citizen representatives of the poor 
gain more control over the allocation of resources in poverty programs, 
there is more at stake to divide them. That is, lower class representa­
tives are greatly affected by policy decisions of the advisory boards, 
task forces and city councils. In addition, policy decisions will have 
direct impact on the lower class representative's constituents and "tar­
get" neighborhood. As lower-class representatives have the most to lose 
or gain from advocacy planning in community development programs, domain 
conflicts are greatest among this class (Marx and Engels, 1906). 
Lower-class representatives in an effort to assert their interests 
and rights have often used tactics which disrupt the citizen board meet­
ing and/or slow down the decision and policy making machinery of the 
poverty programs (Alinsky, 1965; Lowi, 1969; Kramer, 1969; Walton, 1973). 
As lower-class citizen representatives have a greater stake or 
interest in the resource allocation processes and the citizen partici­
pation efforts in community development programs, domain conflicts 
emerge more often among these lower class representatives than among the 
middle-class or non-poor representatives (Alinsky, 1965; Kramer, 1969; 
Peterson, 1970; Wofford, 1971). 
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Based on the above discussion of social class, the following general 
hypothesis is posited: 
G.H.6: The higher the social class, then the less the 
domain conflict. 
Social class and institutionalized thought structure 
Harmon (1970) has described the federal poverty programs as "reformist" 
in design in that few provisions were made for radical program departures 
(e.g., resource and power redistribution). Lowi (1969) has suggested 
that lower class participants in poverty programs are the most dissatis­
fied with the community action efforts as compared with middle-class par­
ticipants. Evaluations of community development programs are shown to 
have reinforced the position of elites and marginally improved the "power-
position" of the lower class or poor (Lowi, 1969; Graves, 1972; Walton, 
1973). 
Edelman (1975) asserts that the members of citizen groups who feel 
that they have received the least of the available resources are more 
likely to resist the community program's decisions on the grounds that 
such decisions contribute to their "unequal" status. Lower class indi­
viduals who may feel "deprived" or have established a sense of "class 
consciousness" often propose more radical proposals for social and econom­
ic change (Marx and Engels, 1906; 1961). 
Free and Cantril (1967) in their study of attitudes toward poverty 
and socioeconomic status, found that the higher the socioeconomic status, 
the more likely an individual would view poverty as a result of lack of 
individual effort. Thus, individuals who view poverty as an individual 
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problem are more likely to propose solutions or action strategies that 
affect only the individual. On the other hand, when the problem of 
poverty is viewed structurally, action strategies take on a more radical 
departure in that proposals are made for structural change (Clark and Hop­
kins, 1969; Capps, 1970). 
The lower class citizen representatives in community development 
programs often adhere to a "New Deal' orientation (Clark and Hopkins, 
1969). Here, they are operating on the assumption that poverty and 
other unjust conditions exist in their neighborhoods as a result of the 
rich exploiting the poor. Where this orientation is present, efforts 
are directed toward "upsetting" the status quo (Clark and Hopkins, 
1969:20). 
Based on the above discussion, it is reasonable to assume that lower 
class citizen representatives will have more liberal institutionalized 
thought structures as compared with middle-class citizen representatives. 
The causal relationship is stated in the following general hypohtesis: 
G.H.7: The higher the social class, then the less liberal 
the institutionalized thought structure. 
Social class and interaction One major assumption of the interest 
group approaches is that individuals mix primarily with others of the 
same socioeconomic status. Such patterns of interaction are applied to 
lower class and well as upper-class individuals. Marx and Engels (1961:23) 
suggest that it is the sharing of a common experience with others of the 
same class that leads a "class in itself" to become a "class for itself." 
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Warren ££ al. (1974) has asserted that members of community organi­
zations interact with each other in terms of their need for scarce re­
sources (i.e., staff support, funds, access to decision making). Inter­
action patterns of an organization's membership body often become 
structured either because all of the members have some common interests 
or because a sub-group has furnished inducements to another sector to work 
in behalf of its interests (Blau, 1974). 
Lower class citizen representative interaction in community develop­
ment programs was a means of gaining access to channels of policy and 
decision making that had been closed to them (Moynihan, 1965; Miller, 
1968). Activism on the part of lower-class individuals was in part shaped 
by the lower class representatives' exclusion, voluntary or otherwise, 
from other voluntary associations. Interaction in poverty board meeting 
and task force sessions was shown to be greatest among lower class citizen 
representatives (Zurcher, 1969; 1970a). Thus, as lower class representa­
tives are both "clients" and "planners" in community development programs, 
their interests are articulated through board meetings, task forces, and 
planning conferences. 
Based on the above discussion, it is reasonable to assume that lower 
class citizen representatives will have higher interaction in community 
development programs than middle class citizen representatives. The re­
lationship is formulated in the following general hypothesis: 
G.H.8: The higher the social class, then the less the 
interaction. 
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Social class and voluntary association membership Much has been 
written about the correlates of social class and voluntary association 
membership. There is a general consensus in most of the studies that the 
various indices of social class are related to organization affiliation 
(Wright and Hyman, 1958; 1971; Campbell, e^ , 1960; Tomeh, 1969; Phil­
lips, 1969; Crenson, 1974). Persons of high social class are more likely 
to be affiliated in voluntary associations than are persons of low social 
class. Therefore, it is posited that middle class citizen representatives 
will have higher social participation activity than citizen representatives 
who are lower class. 
Based on the above discussion of social class and voluntary association 
membership, the following general hypothesis is posited: 
G.H.9: The higher the social class, the greater the 
voluntary association membership. 
Ascribed status 
Ascribed status has been described in terms of definitions "assigned 
to individuals with reference to their innate differences or abilities" 
(Linton, 1937:115). Ascription is stratification placement based on 
birth (Smelser and Lipset, 1966); The ultimate in ascribed status is the 
formation of castes. A caste has been defined as "a hierarchy of endo-
gamous divisions in which membership is hereditary and permanent" (Ber-
reman, 1960:20). However, the evidence of racial castes in the United 
States has not been well documented (Cox, 1948). 
Ascribed status in this study is defined in terms of the superordi-
nate-subordinate (e.g., white-black) position that is socially assigned to 
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individuals based on race. Individual as well as institutional racism 
have largely determined the subordinate status of blacks in the United 
States (Cox, 1948). The United States Commission on Civil Disorder (1968) 
concluded that the nation was moving toward two societies, black and 
white, separate and unequal. The marginal status, for the most part, was 
attributed to white racism. That is, the black-white status differentials 
in the U.S. are based on the assumption that whites as a race are inherent­
ly superior, while blacks are inferior as a race. The ascribed status, 
status assigned at birth based on racial attributes, for whites is higher 
than for blacks under the "white racist society" agreed by the U.S. Com­
mission on Civil Disorder (1968). As white racism has been suggested as 
the major factor for the unequal status of blacks vis-a-vis whites, it is 
reasonable to assume that institutionalized racism has assigned higher 
ascribed statuses upon whites as compared to blacks. 
The initiation of "Great Society" programs was one measure taken to 
ameliorate some of the consequences of white racism. Such community pro­
grams brought blacks and whites together, sometimes for the first time, 
into the politics of redevelopment. Individuals entering the community 
development programs brought to these organizations the beliefs, values, 
and attitudes that they had internalized through previous social interac­
tion. This is true for members of one racial or ethnic group compared 
with another (Kriesberg, 1973). Community programs where service areas 
covered diverse ethnic neighborhoods had citizen members who represented 
diverse special interests. The representation of special interests has 
important implication for domain conflict- Specifically, resolution of 
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domain conflict, to a large extent, depends on the extent to which one 
racial group can satisfy its constituents in terms of achieving favorable 
results (Zechmeister and Druckman, 1973). Where black and white neigh­
borhood interests are incompatible, domain conflicts among the citizen 
representatives of the respective neighborhoods will result (Lowenstein, 
1971; Peterson, 1970). 
Peterson (1970) suggests that domain conflicts emerge in community 
development programs where black and white representatives compete for 
some sort of scarce resources. Conflict was greatest in the poverty pro­
grams where racial factionalism was apparent, as black and white members 
oppose each other over the allocation of resources. Silberman (1968) has 
suggested that organizations that have memberships of diverse ethnic and 
racial groups may be unable to arrive at a consensus on politically vola­
tile issues as citizen participation and resource allocation. 
Kramer (1969) asserted that the skills that blacks acquired in 
organizing and structuring the Civil Rights movement were transferred into 
poverty programs. However, the racial tensions and hostilities did not 
disappear once blacks were included in the citizen boards and policy 
councils. Black citizen representatives while serving on the citizen 
boards and councils could "fight poverty" and at the same time gain access 
to policy and decisions channels (Miller, 1965; Moynihan, 1965; Zurcher, 
1970a). As many of the boards and councils which representatives served 
on were advisory in nature, the proposals for "community control" by 
black members were not implemented (Amstein, 1969; Capps, 1970). 
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The inclusion of blacks into a coalition with whites on the various 
citizen boards and councils has engendered dramatic conflicts regarding 
representation, selection process and decision making powers of citizen 
representatives (Carter, 1966; Arnstein, 1969; Zurcher, 1969). The em­
phasis on citizen participation and "community control" movement flourished 
best among blacks that came to regard the local institutions (e.g., police, 
health, welfare, education) controlled by whites or "outsiders" (Capps, 
1970). 
Competition for power within the community organization forces the 
competing leadership to justify their appeal for resident support. The 
black citizen representatives while legitimating the overall community 
action efforts of local programs at the same time must contend with the 
suspicions among constituents of their being "coopted" by the system 
(Benz, 1974; Edelman, 1975). Also, where there is hostility toward black 
involvement in planning and programming, attempts may be made to subvert 
the goals of the organization by using manipulative tactics or by trying 
to bulldoze programs through, regardless of sentiment or opposition. 
Such tactics with the community development program often trigger op­
position and conflict from black representatives (Lowenstein, 1971). 
Based on the above discussion of race and domain conflict with 
community development programs, the following general hypothesis is 
posited: 
G.H.IO: The more superordinate the ascribed status, then 
the less the domain conflict. 
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Ascribed status and institutionalized thought structure In the 
mid-sixties, there developed an increased awareness or "consciousness" 
among blacks in terms of their position in the American society. To a 
large extent, the hostility and riots in the urban centers played a domi­
nant role in shaping the "War on Poverty" programs and strategies (Raab, 
1968; Seligman, 1968; Kramer, 1969). Involvement in resource planning and 
decision making in model cities programs was to serve a dual purpose for 
Blacks: (1) A means of improving the "quality of life" in the black 
community, and (2) a means for blacks to gain "political clout" (Miller, 
1965; Moynihan, 1965; Zurcher, 1970b). However, these two goals or pur­
poses were accepted to varying degrees among the different participating 
individuals and groups. 
The "Black Power" movement in the mid-sixties was a catalyst in 
politicizing the black population in social and political action (Hamil­
ton, 1974). White leaderships were purged from several civil rights or­
ganizations (i.e.. Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee, Congress 
of Racial Equality) in the move toward black assertiveness. Efforts were 
directed toward reorganizing the civil rights organization with their 
"white heads and black bodies" (Hamilton, 1974). 
Most studies of community action programs in the United States show 
that the "politicization" of blacks was one major outcome of their federal 
poverty effort (Kramer, 1969; Lowi, 1969). In addition, the strategies 
that were borrowed from the civil rights movement were of some utiliza­
tion in the poverty programs. Blacks who had been "activists" in civil 
rights organizations often become participants in poverty programming. 
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Kramer (1969) has suggested that the impact of blacks on inner-city 
poverty programs had the effect of politicizing new interest group con­
stituencies and providing them with the training ground in ways of local 
politics. 
Black citizen representatives in coramumity development programs often 
focused on segregation and inequality in the local community, and on the 
American society as a whole. Conflicts and tensions emerge as black rep­
resentatives propose structural solutions to deal with the problem of 
poverty, while white representatives advocate changes at the individual 
level (Clark and Hopkins, 1969). Thus, black representatives are prolific 
in their demands for ending discriminatory practices in employment, educa­
tion, and other areas. The idea of incremental social change has not been 
accepted by black members to the degree as it has by other citizen rep­
resentatives in poverty programs (Edelman, 1975). For many black repre­
sentatives, "community control" and "citizen participation" are sub-
goals that have not been reached (Benz, 1974). 
Based on the above discussion, it seems reasonable to assume that 
white citizen representatives will have less liberal thought structures 
than white representatives in community development programs. This re­
lationship is stated in the following general hypothesis: 
G.H.ll: The more superordinate the ascribed status, then the 
less liberal the institutionalized thought structure. 
Ascribed status and interaction The Black-white cleavage in the 
United States represents the most salient ethnic cleavage in contempo­
rary America (Jackman and Jackman, 1973). In community action efforts. 
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black and white participants were involved in areas of poverty intervention 
which often took the two groups on a colision course (Peterson, 1970). 
Interaction in community development programs takes place through formal 
board meetings, task force meetings, planning conferences and informal 
group sessions. For the most part, the informal interactions are pat­
terned along racial lines. In addition, coalitions between citizen rep­
resentatives are structured along racial and ideological lines (Lowenstein, 
1971). 
As poverty funds are allocated to communities in part based on the 
level of poverty in the area, often the "target areas" also have high 
concentrations of blacks. Federal poverty funds have "non-discrimination" 
provisions and allow blacks to participate at varying levels within the 
community development program structure. The interests of the black com­
munity are articulated through its citizen representatives. Interaction 
in strategy sessions, and formal policy board meetings are the major 
channels through which proposals are articulated. In articulating com­
munity and neighborhood interests, black representatives interact more 
often than white representatives on community development programs 
(Zurcher, 1970b). 
One explanation of high interaction among black representatives is 
the idea of "class consciousness" or the "ethnic community" thesis (Lane, 
1969; Olsen, 1970). This thesis suggest that blacks may become more 
active in community programs because of pressures exerted upon them with­
in their ethnic community to conform to the norms of the black community. 
Thus, it is reasonable to assume that white citizen representatives will 
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have less interaction than Black citizen representatives in community 
development programs. This relationship is presented in the following 
general hypothesis: 
G.H.12: The more superordinate the ascribed status, then 
the less the interaction. 
Ascribed status and voluntary association membership Studies on 
the voluntary association membership rates among the various racial groups 
are far from conclusive as the findings are contradictory. One of the most 
prevalent interpretation of black-white differences in social participation 
is based on socioeconomic status. As blacks are found predominately in 
the lower socioeconomic groups, they are less likely to be affiliated with 
formal organizations (Campbell £t al., 1960; Wright and Hyman, 1958; 1971). 
However, once the limiting effect of socioeconomic status has been re­
moved, blacks actually tend to participate more actively than whites and 
in a wider range of social and political activities (Babchuk and Booth, 
1969; Orum, 1966; Renzi, 1968; Olsen, 1970; Ross and Wheeler, 1971). 
In an investigation focused on the voluntary association membership 
of Anglo, Black and Mexican-American, Williams and Babchuk (1973) found 
that ethnicity proved to be an important variable in predicting social 
participation, with blacks having the highest social participation rate 
of the three ethnic groups studied. 
Based on the above discussion, it seems reasonable to assume that 
black representatives will have higher levels of voluntary association 
membership than white representatives. The general hypothesis can be 
stated as: 
G.H.13: The more superordinate the ascribed status, then 
the less the voluntary association membership. 
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The Theoretical Model 
The general purpose of this study has been to develop and test a 
causal model for understanding and predicting domain conflict within a 
community development program. Citizen representatives who are members 
of the local poverty boards were the empirical referent for this study. 
Domain conflict was the variable to be explained, while five explanatory 
variables were distilled from the literature: institutionalized thought 
structure, interaction, voluntary association membership, social class, 
and ascribed status. A causal model was developed utilizing the above 
six variables. Mulford e^ al. (1972) have defined a causal model as the 
articulation and evaluation of relationships between all explanatory and 
explained variables. 
Mulford _e^ al. (1971) have specified a number of advantages of 
using a path model over regression analysis. Mulford (1971:13) 
write: 
First, variables may exist in complex relationships or 
networks with each other. Path analysis attempts to measure 
and describe these networks. Second, path analysis examines 
the direct and indirect causal relationships among variables 
on each other. Thus, path analysis can serve as a guide in 
evaluation research by providing more information about the 
nature of the relationship among the variables. 
In the development of the causal model, the explained variable, 
domain conflict, was explicated along with a presentation of theoretical 
and empirical literature on the concept. The discussion then takes up 
each explanatory variable while at the same time presenting the pre­
sumed causal relationship between the explanatory variable and the 
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explained variable, and the presumed causal relationship between the 
explanatory variable as they are introduced into the model. The causal 
model is developed starting with the explained variable, domain conflict 
(Xg) and working backward toward presenting and explicating each of the 
explanatory variables. The explanatory variables are introduced into the 
causal model in the following order: First, institutionalized thought 
structure (X^); Second, interaction (X^); Third, voluntary association 
membership (X^); Fourth, social class (X^); and Fifth, ascribed status 
(X^) . A summary of the causal model is shown in Figure 2.2. Concepts in 
the model are presented at the theoretical level. A causal chain is shown 
by the arrows ( >) in Figure 2.3 which indicate that a variable is pre­
sumed to be the antecedent (cause) and the other variable the consequences 
(effect). The double arrowed dashes line (m ^) between voluntary as­
sociation membership (X^) and institutionalized thought structure indi­
cates that no relationship is predicted between the two variables. 
A major assumption of this causal model was that the explanatory 
variables follow a time-sequence in the "real world." That is, ascribed 
status is presumed to occur first in the real world. As ascribed status, 
race, is conferred at birth, it was the most logical choice. Ascribed 
status was presumed to have causal relations to domain conflict, insti­
tutionalized thought structure, interaction, and voluntary association 
membership (see G.H.7, G.H.13, G.H.ll, and G.H.9). A causal relation was 
not posited between ascribed status and social class. 
The second explanatory variable that is presumed to occur in the real 
world was social class. Social class is presumed to be causally related 
G.H.8 
Social Class X9 1 
Domain Conflict X, \G.H 
Conflict of Interest-Understanding < 
j , /G.H.I 
Ajg / 
Institutionalized 
• Thought Structure Xc ' 
G.H.10 
G.H.llN 
Interaction X, 
Ascribed Status X 
Voluntary Association Membership X 
Figure 2.2. A conceptual causal model of explaining domain conflict among certain representatives. 
The two variable general hypotheses and paths are shown by G.H. numbers and directional 
arrows, respectively. 
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Co domain conflict, institutionalized thought structure, interaction, and 
voluntary association membership (see G.H.6, G.H.12, G.H.IO, and G.H.8). 
The third explanatory variable that is presumed to occur in the real 
world was voluntary association membership. Voluntary association mem­
bership is presumed to be causally related to domain conflict and inter­
action (see G.H.4 and G.H.5). 
Interaction was presumed to be the fourth explanatory variable to 
occur in the real world. Interaction was presumed to be related to domain 
conflict and institutionalized thought structure (see G.H.2 and G.H.I). 
Finally, institutionalized thought structure was presumed to be the fifth 
explanatory variable to occur in the real world. The causal relationship 
was posited between institutionalized thought structure and domain con­
flict (see G.H.I). 
The causal priorities among the variables were specified in the above 
section. The specification of priorities indicates how the equations of 
the model are to be set up, and the operations, along with the data, pro­
vide the basis for deriving path coefficients. Path analysis requires a 
theory of causal priorities. This study assumes that since ascribed 
status is assigned at birth, it is the first explanatory variable to 
enter the model. Social class follows ascribed status as social class may 
be achieved later in life or "inherited." Voluntary association member­
ship and interaction are the next two variables to enter the model as 
it is assumed that both variables are affected by ascribed status and 
social class. The final explanatory variable to enter the model is 
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institutionalized thought structure. An individual's thought structure is 
assumed to be a consequence a combination of ascribed status, social class, 
voluntary association membership and interaction. 
To summarize briefly, the theoretical model in this study presents a 
framework on which to study domain conflict. Specifically, the purpose of 
the model was to pull together the factors involved in domain conflict in 
that better understanding and prediction can be made. The model has 
special implications for the community development program setting as well 
as other formal organizations setting. That is, if the elements or factors 
that have been defined as explanatory variables are present in a community 
organization, domain conflict can be predicted with some degree of ac­
curacy. With the prediction and understanding of domain conflict, plan­
ners and other policy makers may employ the model to resolve conflicts. 
The theoretical as well as the policy implication of the domain conflict 
model will be specified later on in this dissertation. 
In the chapter which follows, variables theorized in the causal 
model will be operationalized so that empirical hypotheses can be formu­
lated to test the general hypotheses and the overall theoretical model. 
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CHAPTER III. METHODS 
Introduction 
The hypotheses and the causal model developed in Chapter II were 
formulated at a general level. In this chapter the concepts included 
in the general hypotheses and model are operationalized at the empirical 
level. The methods and procedure of this study are presented in four 
sections. The chapter opens with a discussion of the sample. Attention 
then turns to the collection of data. The discussion then takes up the 
operationalization and measurement of concepts to be formulated in the 
empirical hypotheses. The chapter concludes with the methods of analysis 
used in the study. 
The Sample 
The data in this study are based on a sample of citizen board 
representatives from the Des Moines Neighborhood Development Program. The 
citizen board members are representatives on six Neighborhood Priority 
Boards and a Central Advisory Board. Respondents on the Neighborhood 
Priority Boards are elected representatives from the 6 federally desig­
nated "Prime Service Areas." Whereas, respondents on the Central Advisory 
Board are either elected or appointed to their position in the Neighbor­
hood Development Program. The individual citizen board representatives 
was used as the unit of analysis. Thus, the sample is composed of 115 of 
the 125 citizen board representatives in the Neighborhood Development 
Program. 
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Collection of Data 
Interview schedule and questionnaire 
Data were collected by means of both a mailed questionnaire and a 
structured interview schedule. This plan was initiated primarily to re­
duce structured interview time. The respondents were citizen board 
representatives of the local community development program. The ques­
tionnaires consisted of the scales assessing domain conflict, and insti­
tutionalized thought structure. The structured interview schedule in­
cluded items assessing citizen representatives' interaction, voluntary 
association membership, social class and ascribed status. The first 
draft of the measurement instruments were pretested using the "alternate" 
citizen representatives from the local community development program who 
were not included for the research sample. Following the pretest, several 
changes were made in the original instruments. 
Data collection procedures 
The initial design of this research study was presented to the 
citizen board members and Neighborhood Development Staff personnel in 
August, 1974. During this time, the author was employed as a program 
planner with the program. Following revisions, the final design of the 
research study was presented before the citizen board representatives in 
June, 1975. This time, the author had a contractural agreement with the 
Neighborhood Development Program to conduct the research study. 
The questionnaires were mailed to the citizen board representatives 
in June, 1975, with accompanying cover letters from the Chairman of the 
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Central Advisory Board of the Neighborhood Development Program eliciting 
respondent cooperation. Respondents were instructed to return completed 
questionnaires to the Neighborhood Development's Central office. The 
personal interviews were conducted during the months of August and 
September, 1975. The allocation of resources and prioritization of ser­
vices had been completed six months prior to the interviewing. At the 
time of this study, there appeared to be little open conflict or hostili­
ties among the citizen representatives in regard to the administrative 
and programmatic functions of the program. In an effort to involve the 
neighborhood staff persons in the study, the Neighborhood Service Area Co­
ordinators were given the responsibility of scheduling the date and time 
of the personal interviews. Through the techniques of field interview and 
mailed questionnaire, a total of 115 citizen representatives were con­
tacted. Seven citizen board members flatly refused to participate in the 
study, and three representatives could not be reached or contacted. Tele­
phone calls were made to respondents by the Neighborhood Service Area Co­
ordinators to remind representatives to complete and mail the question­
naires, and at the same time the personal interview was scheduled. 
Operationalization and Measurement 
In this section each of the explanatory and explained concepts 
specified in Chapter II are operationalized and measured. General and 
empirical hypotheses are also stated. The first concept to be operation­
alized is the explained variable, domain conflict. Following the discus­
sion of domain conflict, each of the explanatory variables is operationally 
defined and measured. 
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Domain conflict 
Domain conflict was defined in terms of responses that individuals 
gave to items addressing scarce resources (e.g., conflict of interest) and 
divergent espistemologies (e.g., conflict of understanding). Domain con­
flict is operationalized through the citizen representatives' perception 
of resource allocation and citizen participation in the community-
organization. 
A modified version of Richards and Goudy's (1971) Citizen Participa­
tion Score was used to measure the respondents citizen participation con­
flict level. The respondent's resource allocation conflict was measured 
by a three-item Resource Allocation Conflict Score. Thus, the Citizen 
Participation Conflict Score assesses conflict of understanding, while the 
Resource Allocation Conflict Score assesses conflict of interest. A brief 
discussion of each component and the development of a composite measure of 
domain conflict is presented below. 
Component score 3^: citizen participation conflict score The 
questions used in the Citizen Participation Conflict Score are Likert-type 
items with four response choices for each question: namely, strongly 
agree (SA), agree (A), disagree (DA), and strongly disagree (SD). The ten 
items and respective scoring scheme are as follows: 
3 2 10 
SA A D SD 1. Citizen participation makes for a more effective Neighbor­
hood Development Program. 
0 12 3 
SA A D SD 2. Citizen participation has improved the relations between 
people in the Neighborhood Development neighborhoods. 
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0 12 3 
SA A D SD 3. Citizen participation is just another way of "using" the 
residents in the neighborhood. 
0 12 3 
SA A D SD 4. Citizen participation helps people feel a part of the 
neighborhood. 
3 2 10 
SA A D SD 5. Citizen participation provides an opportunity for residents 
to speak, but without being heard. 
3 2 10 
SA A D SD 6. Citizens are often frustrated from the lack of input into 
the decision-making processes of the program. 
0 12 3 
SA A D SD 7. Citizen participation in the Neighborhood Development Pro­
gram is really causing less exploitation of the residents. 
3 2 10 
SA A D SD 8. Citizen participation has generated special interest groups 
that are competing for limited resources in the 
neighborhoods. 
3 2 10 
SA A D SD 9. Citizen participation is nothing more than a gimmick since 
the residents have not been given any real power. 
3 2 10 
SA A D SD 10. Citizen participation has contributed to an increased class 
consciousness among neighborhood residents. 
The theoretical range of the Citizen Participation Conflict Score was 0 to 
30, with an observed range of 4 to 25 and a mean of 12. Scores which are 
greater than the mean score may be considered as "high" citizen partici­
pation conflict, while "low" scores (e.g., scores equal to or less than the 
mean score) are indications of low citizen participation conflict. Agree­
ment with the items where citizen participation is described as a "gim­
mick," as "using the residents," "frustrating residents," "generating 
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special interest," and "increasing class consciousness" are indicators of 
citizen participation conflict and are assigned high scores. The distri­
bution of Citizen Participation Conflict Scores is presented in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1. Distribution of citizen participation conflict scores 
Range Frequency Percent Cumulative 
frequency 
0 - 1 0  6 2  5 3 . 9  6 2  
11 - 20 46 40.0 108 
2 1 - 3 0  7  6 . 1  1 1 5  
Component score 2: resource allocation conflict score The 
Resource Allocation Conflict Score was empirically measured by using a 
Guttman-type measure. The respondents were asked the following three 
questions: 
1. In thinking about funds coming into Des Moines for community 
development programs, would you say that such funds are equally 
or unequally distributed across the six Neighborhood Develop­
ment neighbhorhoods? 
2. Do you feel that this neighborhood (neighborhood which respondent 
represents) has received its fair share of funds from the Neigh­
borhood Development Program? 
3. What is your feeling on the impact of programs provided through 
Neighborhood Development, in general, would you say that the 
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programs have caused greater or less competition among residents 
of the neighborhood? 
Responses to item 1 was simply equally or unequally distributed. An 
unequal was assigned a score of 1, and equal a score of 0. In item 2, the 
responses were yes and no. A yes was assigned a score of 0 and a no a 
score of 1. Finally, the responses in item 3 were less and greater. A 
less was assigned a score of 0, and a greater was scored as 1. The 
Resource Allocation Conflict Score was obtained by a summation of the three 
items. The theoretical range of the scale was 0 to 3 with the observed 
range of 0 to 3. In this Guttman-type scale, scores less than 2 are con­
sidered as "low" resource allocation conflict, while scores equal to or 
greater than 2 are considered indications of "high" resource allocation 
conflict. The actual distribution of Resource Allocation Conflict Scores 
is presented in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2. Distribution of resource allocation conflict scores 
Range Frequency Percent Cumulative 
frequency 
0 - 1  3 4  2 9 . 6  3 4  
2 - 3  8 1  7 0 . 4  1 1 5  
The coefficient of reproducibility for the Citizen Participation 
Conflict Scores and Resource Allocation Conflict Scores were .79 and .92, 
respectively. These two measures were combined into a composite measure 
to obtain an overall evaluation of domain conflict among citizen 
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representatives. The intercorrelation between the two measures showed 
a statistically significant positive correlation (r = .27, < .05). A 
major assumption of this study posits that the two elements of domain 
conflict are of equal import. Therefore, each respondent's Resource Al­
location Conflict Score was multiplied by a factor of 10 (making the 
theoretical range of each scale 0 to 30) . The theoretical range of com­
posite measure. Domain Conflict Score, was 0 to 60 with an observed range 
of 4 to 53 and a mean of 32. The actual distribution of Domain Conflict 
Scores is presented in Table 3.3. 
Table 3.3. Distribution of domain conflict sc^ore 
Range Frequency Percent Cumulative 
frequency 
0 - 1 0  12 10.4 12 
11 - 20 16 14.0 28 
21 - 30 19 16.5 47 
31 - 40 37 32.1 84 
41 - 50 26 22.7 110 
51 - 60 5 4.3 115 
Again, scores which are equal to or less than the mean of 32 are 
considered "low" Domain Conflict, while scores which are greater than the 
mean score are indicators of "high" Domain Conflict. In testing the em­
pirical hypotheses, the Domain Conflict Scores was used as the measure of 
citizen representatives domain conflict. 
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In constructing a measurement instrument to assess citizen partici­
pation and resource allocation conflict, the community development organi­
zation's goals were used as a frame of reference on which board members 
could agree or disagree. Citizen participation as mandated in CDA Letter 
lOB (1970) outlines specific goals of community programs. The items in­
cluded in the Citizen Participation Conflict Scale and the Resource Al­
location Conflict Scale were derived from these program goals. For 
instance, citizen participation was described as an essential element in 
community programming: It was designed as a means of (1) improving re­
lations between neighborhood residents, (2) providing opportunities for 
residents to articulate grievances, (3) developing community awareness, 
and (4) gaining access to policy and decision making. 
The Resource Allocation Conflict Score also reflects the respondent's 
agreement or disagreement with the organization's distribution of federal 
funds across the poverty neighborhoods. In many instances, funds are 
allocated based on "need." While in other cases, funds may be allocated 
equally across the target areas. The idea of "deprivation" is a useful 
concept in describing the perceptions that may be expressed through the 
Resource Allocation Conflict items. 
Thus, domain conflict is conceptualized as in the mind of the 
individual citizen representative in terms of perceptions of organizational 
goals. 
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As the explained variable, domain conflict, has been operationalized 
and empirically measured, the explication of the explanatory variables is 
presented in the following order: institutionalized thought structure, 
interaction, voluntary association membership, social class, and ascribed 
status. 
Institutionalized thought structure 
It was hypothesized that the more liberal a citizen representatives' 
institutionalized thought structure, the greater the domain conflict. 
Institutionalized thought structure was defined as the combination of ways 
of thinking about social and economic problems and the methods of insti­
gating social change. Institutionalized thought structure was operation­
alized as the degree of liberalism of citizen representatives toward 
federal poverty programs. That is, the extent to which citizen repre­
sentatives believe the federal government should be involved in poverty 
intervention programs. Again, a modified version of Richards and Goudy's 
(1971) Attitudes Toward Government Programs Scale was used as a form of 
reference to measure the institutionalized thought structure variable. 
Thus, the empirical measures of institutionalized thought structure was 
called the Liberalism Score. 
The questions used in the Liberalism Score form a Likert-type scale 
where each question has four response choices, namely, strongly agree (SA), 
agree (A), disagree (D), and strongly disagree (SA). The six items and 
respective scoring scheme are as follows: 
3 2 10 
SA A D SD 1. Government programs have not gone far enough to eliminate 
poverty in this country. 
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0 12 3 
SA A D SD 2. Government programs create dependent classes of people. 
0 12 3 
SA A D SD 3. Government programs kill the spirit of individualism which 
made this country great. 
3 2 10 
SA A D SD 4. Government programs have strengthened the economic and 
social institutions in this country 
3 2 10 
SA A D SD 5. Most people deserve the benefits they receive from Govern­
ment programs. 
0 12 3 
SA A D SD 6. Government programs have grown in size to the point of 
being unmanageable. 
The theoretical range of the Liberalism Score was 0 to 18, with 
an observed range of 2 to 18 and a mean of 11. The distribution of the 
Liberalism Score is presented in Table 3.4. 
Table 3.4. Distribution of liberalism scores 
Range Frequency Percent Cumulative 
frequency 
0 - 6  1 7  1 4 . 8  1 7  
7 - 12 46 40.0 63 
13 - 18 52 45.2 115 
The Liberalism Score was obtained by summing the six-items in the 
measure. Respondents whose Liberalism Score was greater than the mean 
score considered "high" liberal (e.g., liberal-humanitarian), while 
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respondents whose scores are equal to or less than the mean score are 
considered "low" liberal (e.g. conservative) representatives. As the 
Liberalism Score assesses the respondent's attitude toward government 
programs, "high" scores are indicative of support for federal government 
intervention into poverty areas, while "low" scores are indications of 
criticism of federal poverty intervention programs. The empirical hypothe­
ses for the Liberalism Score to the Domain Conflict Score is as follows: 
E.H.I: If Liberalism Score is high, then the Domain Conflict 
Score will be high. 
Interaction 
It was hypothesized that: (1) the greater the interaction, the 
greater the domain conflict; (2) the greater the interaction, the more 
liberal the institutionalized thought structure. 
Interaction as a concept is defined as the interpersonal conflicts 
which occur between individuals or groups of individuals. It is opera-
tionalized as the level of formal and informal contacts between citizen 
representatives. 
Again, a composite measure was used to measure the citizen repre­
sentatives' interaction. This composite measure is called the Inter­
action Score. The Interaction Score consisted of two components: (1) 
Meeting Attendance Score assessing the amount of formal interaction, and 
(2) Friendship Interaction Score assessing the amount of informal inter­
action. A brief discussion of each component is presented below. 
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Component Meeting Attendance Score 
First, the question used to assess the respondent's formal 
interaction through board meeting attendance was: 
About how many Community Development Board meetings a 
month would you say you have attended on the average over the 
past six months? 
The actual number of meetings that the respondents indicated was 
recorded as their Meeting Attendance Score. The theoretical range of the 
meeting score was 0 to 9, with an observed range of 2 to 7 and a mean of 
3.5. The actual distribution of the meeting attendance score is pre­
sented in Table 3.5. 
Table 3.5. Distribution of meeting attendance scores 
Range Frequency Percent Cumulative 
frequency 
0 - 3 55 47.8 55 
4 - 6 56 48.7 111 
7 - 9  4  3 . 5  1 1 5  
Component Friendship Interaction Score 
Three questions were asked each respondent about informal 
interactions with other citizen representatives. The items consisted 
of the Friendship Interaction Scale developed by Blau (1961). The 
questions were: 
1. How many really close friends do you have on this board that 
you occasionally talk over confidential matters with? 
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2. How often do you get to visit the friend(s) that you know best 
on this board? 
3. Would you say that you go around with a group of close friends 
on this board who visit back and forth in each other's houses? 
Responses to item 1 was simply none or one or two or more. The none 
or one was assigned a score of 0, and two or more a 1. In item 2, re­
sponses were either once ^  month or less or more than once ^  month. The 
once ^  month or less response was assigned a score of 0, and more than 
once a. month a score of 1. The response to the third item was or yes. 
A n£ was assigned a score of 0, and yes a score of 1. The Friendship 
Interaction Score was obtained by summing up the three items. The theo­
retical range was 0 to 3 with an actual range of 0 to 3 and a mean of 1.7. 
The actual distribution of Friendship Interaction Scores is presented in 
Table 3.6. 
Table 3.6. Distribution of friendship interaction scores 
Range Frequency Percent Cumulative 
frequency 
0 - 1 42 36.5 42 
2 - 3  7 3  6 3 . 5  1 1 5  
Composite ; Interaction Score 
The coefficient of reproducibility for the Friendship Interaction 
Score was .90. As mentioned earlier, the meeting attendance sums and 
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friendship scores were built into a composite measure called the Interac­
tion Score. Since an assumption of this study is that formal and informal 
interaction are of equal importance in domain conflict (see Chapter II), 
each respondent's Friendship Interaction Score was multiplied by a factor 
weight of 3 to make it have a theoretical range equal to that of the 
Meeting Attendance Score (e.g., 0 to 9). The intercorrelation between the 
Friendship Interaction Score and Meeting Attendance Score was .28. Thus, 
the theoretical range of the composite measures of interaction. Interac­
tion Score, was 0 to 18 with an actual range of 2 to 16 and a mean of 8.6. 
The actual distribution of the Interaction Scores is described in Table 
3.7. 
Table 3.7. Distribution of interaction scores^ 
Range Frequency Percent Cumulative 
frequency 
0 - 3  12 10.4 12 
4 - 8  40 34.8 52 
9 - 1 3  56 48.7 108 
14 - 18 7 6.1 115 
^A composite measure of interaction. 
Thus, a "high" score on the Interaction Score was indicative of "high" 
interaction of the citizen representative with other members and a "low" 
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score represented "low" interaction. The empirical hypothesis relating 
Interaction Scores to Domain Conflict is: 
E.H.2: If Interaction Score is high, then the Domain 
Conflict Score will be high. 
The empirical and statistical hypothesis relating Interaction Scores 
to Liberalism Scores is stated as follows: 
E.H.3: If Interaction Score is high, then Liberalism 
Score will be high. 
Voluntary association membership 
In an earlier section, it was hypothesized that: (1) the greater 
the voluntary association membership, the lower the domain conflict, and 
(2) the greater the voluntary association membership, the greater the 
interaction. 
Voluntary association membership is defined as activity in community 
and other formal organizations. In this study, voluntary association mem­
bership is operationalized as social participation in community and other 
formal organizations outside of the Neighborhood Development Program. 
Chapin's (1952) Social Participation Score was used to measure the re­
spondents voluntary association membership. The scale consists of four 
components: membership, attendance, financial contribution, and offices 
held. 
The coefficient of reproduciability for the Social Participation 
Score was .90. The breakdown of the scoring scheme includes: 0 score for 
non-members; 1 for membership.; 2 for attendance; 3 for contribution; 4 for 
committee; and 5 for officer. Scored responses for the four components 
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were summed to form the Social Participation Score. The theoretical 
range of the scale was 0 to infinity. However, the actual range was 0 
to 97 with a mean of 18.8. The actual distribution of the Social Par­
ticipation Score is presented in Table 3.8. 
Table 3.8. Distribution of social particpation scores 
Range Frequency Percent Cumuative 
frequency 
0 - 20 75 65.2 75 
21 - 40 26 22.6 101 
41 - 60 10 8.7 110 
61 - 80 3 2.6 114 
81 - 100 1 0.9 115 
The relationships between voluntary association membership and domain 
conflict may be stated in the following hypotheses: 
E.H.4: If Social Participation Score is high, then Domain 
Conflict Score will be low. 
E.H.5: If Social Participation Score is high, then 
Interaction Score will be low. 
Social class 
It was hypothesized that: (1) the higher the social class, then the 
less the domain conflict; (2) the higher social class, the less liberal 
the institutionalized thought structure; (3) the higher the social class, 
the less the interaction; (4) the higher the social class, the greater 
the voluntary association membership. 
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Social class is defined as social stratification based on status. 
Social class in this study is operationalized as the socioeconomic status 
of the citizen representative. Among social scientists, the interest 
group as well as pluralist approaches assume that the various components 
of an individual's socioeconomic status (e.g., education, occupation, and 
income) are highly correlated (Mitchell, 1970:571). 
The measure of social class in this study was Hollingshead's (1957) 
two-factor Index of Social Position. The index utilizes occupation and 
education to determine social class. Respondent's occupation was scored 
according to the following scheme: (1) Laborer, farm, unskilled, (2) 
service worker, semi-skilled, (3) skilled manual, craftsman, (4) clerical, 
sales, (5) administrative personnel, (6) business manager, proprietors, 
(7) professionals. The scoring scheme for education was as follows: (1) 
0-8 years, (2) 9-11 years, (3) high school graduate, (4) some college, 
(5) college graduate, (6) work after BA/BS, (7) advanced degree. Each 
respondent's scale score on occupation was multiplied by a factor of 7; 
and the scale score for education was multipled by a factor weight of 4. 
Thus, occupation is seen as having a greater weight in measuring social 
class (Hollingshead, 1957). These factors are then summed into a composite 
score which is called the Index of Social Position. The coefficient of 
reproducibility for the Index of Social Position was .95. Its theoretical 
range was 11 to 77 with an actual range of 11 to 70 and a mean of 43.7. 
The actual distribution of the Index of Social Position is presented in 
Table 3.9. 
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Table 3.9. Distribution of index of social position 
Range Frequency Percent Cumulative 
frequency 
11 - 17 7 6.1 7 
18 - 27 18 15.7 25 
28 - 43 22 19.1 47 
44 - 60 49 42.6 96 
61 - 77 19 16.5 115 
Although income is an alternate measure of social class, the inclusion 
or exclusion of income is believed to be inconsequential as a variable in 
this study. There was a relatively strong intercorrelation between in­
come and the Index of Social Position (r - .77). Thus, the Index of Social 
Position was selected as the measure of social class because this two 
factor index represents a broader view of the social class variable (Hol-
lingshead, 195 7). Again, "high" scores on the Index of Social Position 
represented "high" social class, while "low" scores indicated "low" social 
class. 
The empirical hypotheses are formulated as follows: 
E.H.6: If Index of Social Position is high, then Domain 
Conflict Score will be low. 
E.H.7: If Index of Social Position is high, then Liberalism 
Score will be low. 
E.H.8: If Index of Social Position is high, then Interaction 
Score will be low. 
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E.H.9: If Index of Social Position is high, then Social 
Participation Score will be high. 
Ascribed status 
It was hypothesized that: (1) the higher the ascribed status, the 
less the domain conflict; (2) the higher the ascribed status, then the 
less liberal the institutionalized thought structure; (3) the higher the 
ascribed status, then less the interaction; and (4) the higher the 
ascribed status, then the greater the voluntary association membership. 
Ascribed social status is defined as biological or group attributes 
(e.g., sex, race) of the individual which determine stratification place­
ment. Ascribed social status in this study is operationally defined as 
the race of the citizen representative. The concept of race was assigned 
scores as follows: black was assigned a score of 0 and white a score of 
1. Thus, the dichotomous concept of race was scored as a "dummy" variable. 
Dummy variables are especially useful when a nominal-scale variable (e.g., 
race) is inserted into a regression equation (Nie, _al., 1975:373). 
That is, the metric values of 0 and 1 may be treated as interval variables. 
The theoretical range was 0 to 1 with an observed range of 0 to 1. The 
actual distribution of black and white respondents is presented in Table 
3.10. 
Table 3.10. Distribution of race "scores" 
Range Frequency Percent Cumulative 
frequency 
0 (Black) 39 33.9 39 
1 (White) 76 66.1 115 
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The empirical hypotheses are presented as follows: 
E.H.IO: If Race Score is high, then Domain Conflict Score 
will be low. 
E.H.ll; If Race Score is high, then Liberalism Score will 
be low. 
E.H.12: If Race Score is high, then Interaction Score will 
be low. 
E.H.13: If Race Score is high, then Social Participation 
Score will be low. 
Test of Paths in the Theoretical Model 
The six variables in the path model presented in Figure 2.2 have been 
operationally defined and empirically measured in the previous section. 
Based on this path model, a set of recursive equations for the path model 
which represent cause and effect relationships among variables can be 
written as follows: 
^3 ^  ^ 31.2^1 •*" ^32.1 ^ 2 ®3 
^4 ^41.23^1 ^42.13^2 ^43.12^3 ®4 
% ^51.234^1 ^52.134^2 ^54.123^4 
^6 = ^61.2345% + ^ 62.1345X2 + ^63.1245^3 ^64.1235^4 + 
b65.1234%5 + 
The above equation represents theoretical paths in the causal model. 
Each path coefficient represents the direct influence of a particular path 
in the model. 
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Methods of Analysis 
Two major statistical techniques were ençloyed in the analysis of 
data in this study. First, bivariable correlation analysis was used to 
test the two-variable hypotheses. The .05 level of probability was used 
as an acceptable indication of a statistical significant relationship. 
However, the tabular values at the .001, .01, and .05 level for relevant 
degrees of freedom are specified as an aid in interpreting the findings. 
A one-tailed F test was used because the direction of the expected rela­
tionships was specified in the hypotheses. Second, a path analysis tech­
nique was used to assess the causal model and to test the paths in the 
theoretical model. As a major portion of this dissertation research is 
exploratory in nature, the .10 level of significance with a one-tailed 
F test was used to assess the causal model. 
A discussion of the findings based on the testing of the bivariate 
empirical hypothesis and the path model is presented in the following 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER IV. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
Introduction 
In Chapter II general hypotheses were derived from theory and previous 
research and stated at the abstract level from the concepts delineated. 
These concepts were operationalized and measured in the empirical setting 
in Chapter III. The purpose of this chapter is to present and discuss the 
findings of the research study. 
The findings of this dissertation will be presented in two main 
sections of this chapter. The first section presents the finding based on 
the tests of the two variable hypotheses. Here, the tests of the bivariate 
hypotheses are discussed in the order as presented in Chapter III. The 
general and empirical hypotheses are restated as an aid in understanding 
the link between theoretical and measurement level concepts. In the sec­
ond section, the statistical tests and evaluation of each path in the 
causal model is discussed. In that section, attention is focused on the 
research variables operating jointly in the path model. 
Statement and Test of General and Empirical Hypotheses 
The results of the regression analysis on the two variable hypotheses 
are presented as a correlation matrix in Table 4.1. The correlation matrix 
displays the magnitude of the relationships between the six research vari­
ables in this study. Below, the results of the test of hypothesis one 
(G.H.I) through hypothesis thirteen (E.K.13) are presented. Then, the 
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Table 4.1. Matrix of intercorrelations^ between the six variables in the 
model 
Variable %2 =3 4^ 5^ 6^ 
- Race 1.00 
X. - Index of Social 
Position .16 1.00 
- Social Participation .09 .60** 1.00 
X, - Interaction 4 -.37** -.25** -.11 1.00 
X^ - Liberalism -.58** -.18* 
CO o
 .16 1.00 
Xg - Domain Conflict -.58** -.28* -.22* .35** -33** 1.00 
^Coefficients of .17 and above are significant at the .05 level of 
significance with 1 and 113 degrees of freedom. 
*Significant at P < .05. 
^^Significant at P < .01. 
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relationship between institutionalized thought structure and domain 
conflict is the first hypothesis to be discussed. 
Institutionalized thought structure and domain conflict 
G.H.I: The more liberal the institutionalized thought structure 
the greater the domain conflict. 
E.H.I: If Liberalism Score is high, the Domain Conflict Score 
will be high. 
The hypothesized relationship between institutionalized thought 
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structure and domain conflict was statistically supported. The R 
value was .11. This value means that Liberalism accounts for 11 per­
cent of the variance in domain conflict among citizen board representa­
tives. As there was a statistically significant correlation (r = .33, 
P < .01) between the two variables, the hypothesized relationship between 
institutionalized thought structure and domain conflict is consistent with 
Warren e^ a2. (1974) appraisal of thought structures in community deci­
sion organizations. 
Thought structures may range from "liberal-humanitarian" to "conserva­
tive" with the more liberal institutionalized thought structures placing 
greater emphasis on challenging the status quo and the traditional dis­
tribution and allocation of power and resources (Mannheim, 1936; Clark and 
Hopkins, 1969; Edelman, 1975). In the case of the community development 
organizations, domain conflicts may result from the citizen representa­
tives emphases and strategies they deem relevant for producing social 
change or "upsetting" the status quo in the target neighborhood (Arnstein, 
1969; Warren, 1974a). 
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The liberal-conservative institutionalized thought structure is 
described in terms of a continuum. Here, the more liberal the thought 
structure, the more likely citizen board representatives are to challenge 
the ideas of consensus, universality, and the motives of individuals who 
are "outsiders" (e.g., non-poor, mayoral appointees). On the other hand, 
the more conservative thought structures are seen as buttressing the "es­
tablishment" or existing order, reinforce the status quo of the privileged, 
and advocate only marginal strategies for the re-distribution of wealth, 
power, and status (Lowi, 1969; Clark and Hopkins, 1969; Graves, 1972; 
Chatman, 1972; Edelman, 1975). 
Therefore, the above finding in this study confirms the proposition 
that the more liberal the institutionalized thought structure, then the 
greater the level of domain conflict expressed by the citizen board 
representatives. 
Interaction and domain conflict 
G.H.2: The greater the interaction, then the greater the domain 
conflict. 
E.H.2: If Interaction Score is high, then Domain Conflict Score 
will be high. 
The obtained correlation coefficient (r = .35, P < .01) confirmed the 
2 
hypothesized relationship between interaction and domain conflict. The R 
value was .12. In other words, interaction explained 12 percent of the 
variance in the domain conflict variable. Therefore, E.H.2 was weakly 
supported by the data in this study. 
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Warren e^ (1974) assert that members interact with each other in 
community decision organizations in terms of their need for scarce re­
sources. In addition, member interaction can be seen as an indicator of 
member interest. Interaction in a community development program provides 
a number of outlets for the members: (1) it allows members a chance to 
exercise their voice and vote in the prioritization of neighborhood "needs," 
(2) offers an opportunity for members to input their ideas into program 
designs and resource allocation, (3) allows members an opportunity to ar­
ticulate and represent interests of their respective constituent neighbor­
hoods, and (4) builds internal morale as an advocacy group. 
Citizen representatives who interacted most frequently in formal board 
meetings and in friendship groups expressed greater levels of domain con­
flict than citizen representatives who interacted infrequently with other 
board members. These findings seem to suggest that the setting for inter­
action is a major arena where strategies for social change and reform in 
"target neighborhoods" are mapped out. The "strategy sessions" and "cau­
cuses" which are held by citizen representatives can be viewed as a means 
for delineation and articulation of constituent interests. Therefore, the 
greater the interaction among citizen board representatives, then the 
greater the level of domain conflict. As the data support the hypothesized 
relationship between interaction and domain conflict, E.H.2 was supported. 
Interaction and institutionalized thought structure 
G.H.3: The greater the interaction, the more liberal the 
institutionalized thought structure. 
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E.H.3: If Interaction Score is high, then Liberalism Score 
will be high. 
The relationship between interaction and institutionalized thought 
structure was not supported by the data. The correlation coefficient 
2 (r = .16) was not statistically significant at the .05 level. The R value 
of . 02 indicates that interaction accounted for only 2 percent of the vari­
ance in the institutionalized thought structure variable. Therefore, E.H.3 
was not confirmed. 
Voluntary association membership and domain conflict 
G.H.4: The greater the voluntary association membership, then 
the less the domain conflict. 
E.H.4; If Social Participation Score is high, then Domain 
Conflict Score will be low. 
The obtained correlation coefficient weakly supported the hypothesized 
relationship between voluntary association membership and domain conflict 
2 (r = .22, P < .05). The R value of .05 indicates that only 5 percent of 
variance in domain conflict is explained by the voluntary association mem­
bership variable. Participation in a wide range of voluntary association 
and activities outside the community development program seems to reduce 
the likelihood of domain conflict occurring among the membership body 
(Mitchell, 1970; Peterson, 1970). When individual representatives' at­
tention and energies are spread over a wide range of social and political 
activities, the likelihood of these individuals expressing domain conflict 
in the community development program is diminished or reduced. Thus, 
social participation in a wide range of formal organizations reduces the 
domain conflicts that many develop among community development membership 
representatives. 
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As the data indicate that citizen representatives who participate in 
a wide range of voluntary associations express lower levels of domain con­
flict than citizen representatives who are non-participants or "inactive," 
E.H.4 was supported. 
Voluntary association membership and interaction 
G.H.5: The greater the voluntary association membership, then 
the less the interaction. 
E.H.5: If Social Participation Score is high, then Interaction 
Score will be low. 
The data did not support the hypothesized relationship between 
voluntary association membership and interaction. The correlation (r = .11) 
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was not statistically significant at the .05 level. Only 1 percent (R = 
.01) of the variance in interaction was due to the variable voluntary as­
sociation membership. This finding suggests that participation in organi­
zations and associations external to the community development program 
does not have a significant effect on the interaction patterns among citi­
zen representatives in the community development program. Thus, E.H.5 was 
not confirmed by the data and was rejected. 
Social class and domain conflict 
G.H.6: The higher the social class, then the less the domain 
conflict. 
E.H.6: If Index of Social Position is high, then Domain Conflict 
Score will be low. 
The obtained correlation coefficient weakly supported the hypothesized 
relationship between social class and domain conflict (r = -.29, P < .05). 
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The R value was .08. In other words, social class accounted for 8 per­
cent of the variance in domain conflict. These findings weakly support the 
interest-group and Marxian approaches to social conflict (Dahrendorf, 1959; 
Marx and Engels, 1906; 1961; Peterson, 1970; Marx, 1971; Jackman and Jack-
man, 1973; Kriesberg, 1973). Lower class individuals are more likely to 
express greater levels of domain conflict than individuals who are members 
of middle or upper classes. The argument has been clearly demonstrated in 
communities, neighborhoods and community organizations (Coleman, 1957; Low-
enstein, 1971; Warren, 1974b; Crenson, 1974b; Edelman, 1975). 
A fundamental issue which is evident in the poverty intervention 
strategy involves the question of whether lower class individuals can be 
both planners and recipients of social service programs, and whether the 
traditional system representatives (e.g., middle-class individuals) can 
act as advocates and articulate the interests of the poor even against 
their own interests (Capps, 1970; Warren, 1974a). The greatest domain con­
flict occurs among lower class members who may feel "powerless" or "de­
prived" of the scarce poverty funds that are allocated to improve the liv­
ing condition in the low-income neighborhoods. Conflict resolution, to a 
large extent, depends on the extent to which citizen representatives satis­
fy their constituents (Zechmeister and Druckman, 1973). Lower class indi­
viduals have a greater stake in the outcome of federal poverty program than 
middle class persons. That is, policies and practices that are instituted 
under federal and local poverty efforts have numerous implications on the 
lower class individual, family and neighborhood. For instance, social and 
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human resource services (e.g., child care, family planning, skills 
training, counseling, etc.) cut across the boundary of families and 
neighborhoods. 
As the data support the proposition of a statistically significant 
inverse relationship between social class and domain conflict, E.H.6 is 
accepted. 
Social class and institutionalized thought structure 
G.H.7: The higher the social class, then the less liberal the 
institutionalized thought structure. 
E.H.7: If Index of Social Position is high, then the Liberalism 
Score will be low. 
The hypothesized relationship between social class and institution­
alized thought structure was supported by the data. The correlation coef­
ficient was statistically significant in the predicted direction (r = 
2 
-.18, P < .05). The R value was .03 which indicated that only 3 percent 
of the variance in institutionalized thought structure was explained by 
social class. These findings weakly support the argument that a person's 
socioeconomic status with respect to the economic processes of a community 
imposes upon him certain attitudes, values, and interest regarding the 
strategy of federal poverty programs. Specifically, lower class individuals 
are more apt to propose "radical" changes in the existing order (e.g., 
power and resource re-distribution), while middle and upper class individu­
als are more likely to offer incremental proposals for social reform 
(Centers, 1949; Komhauser, 1950; Kramer, 1969; Lowi, 1969; Peterson, 1970; 
Warren, 1974a). 
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The data in this study also suggest that lower class individuals 
welcome federal government intervention into the poverty areas. However, 
they propose structural solutions to the problems of poverty. While mid­
dle class individuals propose to address the problems of the poor on an 
individual basis. As social class had a statistically significant nega­
tive correlation with institutionalized thought structure, E.H.7 was 
accepted. 
Social class and interaction 
G.H.8: The higher the social class, then the less the interaction. 
E.H.8: If Index of Social Position is high, then Interaction 
Score will be low. 
The data weakly support the hypothesized relationship between social 
class and interaction. The relationship was statistically significant in 
2 
the direction as hypothesized (r = -.25, P < .01). The R value was .08. 
In other words, social class accounted for only 8 percent of the variance 
in interaction. These findings suggest that members of high socioeconomic 
status interact less than members of low socioeconomic status in the 
poverty program. Warren (1974a) has suggested that lower class participant 
have more to gain in their interaction in community development programs 
(e.g., improved housing, employment, social services, health services, 
etc.) than the middle class participant who do not meet the "eligibility" 
requirements for the demonstration programs. Thus, middle class members 
are more likely to be "marginal" participants in the poverty programs, 
while lower class representatives are more likely to be "active" members 
in the poverty program. 
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The issues that lower class citizen representatives focus on may be 
at the center of their daily survival needs. Therefore, lower class citi­
zen representatives will tend to direct their energies in interactions in 
the poverty organization, while excluding or limiting themselves in other 
voluntary associations (Harp and Gagan, 1971; Tomeh, 1973). As the data 
confirmed the proposition of a significant inverse relationship between a 
social class and interaction, E.H.8 is accepted. 
Social class and voluntary association membership 
G.H.9: The higher the social class, then the greater the 
voluntary association membership. 
E.H.9: If Index of Social Position is high, then Social 
Participation Score will be high. 
The hypothesized relationship between social class and voluntary 
association membership was supported by the data. The correlation coef­
ficient significantly confirmed the hypothesized relation (r = .60, 
2 
P < .001). The R value of .37 indicates that 37 percent of the variance 
in voluntary association membership was explained by social class. This 
finding is in agreement with the literature reviewed regarding social class 
and organizational affiliation (Campbell et al., 1960; Tomeh, 1969; Phil­
lips, 1969; Wright and Hyman, 1971; Crenson, 1974). Individuals of higher 
social class are more likely to be affiliated or members of voluntary as­
sociations than lower class individuals. Thus, E.H.9 is confirmed by the 
data. 
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Ascribed status and domain conflict 
G.H.IO: The more superordinate the ascribed status, then the 
less the domain conflict. 
E.H.IO: If Race Score is high, then Domain Conflict Score 
will be low. 
The hypothesized relationship between ascribed status (race) and 
domain conflict was supported. A statistically significant correlation 
2 
was found between the two variables (r = -.58, P < .001). The R value was 
.34. In other words, 34 percent of the variance in domain conflict was 
explained by the ascribed status variable (e.g., race). The ascribed 
status of blacks has been described in terms of "subordinate" in American 
society (Myrdal et al., 1944; Cox, 1948; U.S. National Advisory Commis­
sion on Civil Disorders, 1968; Jackman and Jackman, 1973). 
The findings suggest that white citizen representatives express lower 
levels of domain conflict than black citizen representatives. Kramer (1969) 
has suggested that the tension and hostilities of the mid-sixties to a 
large extent structured the movement for the "war on poverty" programs. 
In many instances, individuals who were "activists" in the Civil Rights 
Movements were employed as community organizers and planners in the poverty 
programs (Raab, 1968). Seligman (1968) has asserted that these federal 
programs were a type of "riot insurance." Black involvement in community 
development programs has been described as a means of combatting poverty 
and as a way for blacks to gain "political clout" in their community af­
fairs (Miller, 1965; Moynihan, 1965; Harmon, 1970; Zurcher, 1970b). 
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Thus, white citizen representatives expressed less domain conflict 
as compared with black representatives in the community development pro­
gram. As this argument was supported by the data, E.H.IO is accepted. 
Ascribed status and institutionalized thought structure 
G.H.ll: The more superordinate the ascribed status, then the 
less liberal the institutionalized thought structure. 
E.H.ll: If Race Score is high, the Liberalism Score will be 
low. 
The hypothesized relationship between ascribed status (race) and 
institutionalized thought structure was supported by the data. There was 
a significant correlation between the two variables (r =-.58, P < .001). 
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The R value of .34 indicates that 34 percent of the variance of institu­
tionalized thought structure was explained by the ascribed status variable. 
These findings are consistent with the earlier studies of "superordinates" 
investment in status quo (îfyrdal e£ al,, 1944; Cox, 1948; Clark and Hop­
kins, 1969; Lowi, 1969; Marx, 1971; Kriesberg, 1973). Whites have been 
shown to have more "conservative" views on poverty intervention than 
blacks. As blacks have been victimized by individual and institutional 
racism in the United States, they are more likely to propose more "radi­
cal" strategies under federal poverty intervention programs than whites. 
Citizen representatives entering the community development organiza­
tion bring to that organization the beliefs and values that they have in­
ternalized through socialization. In the case of middle class citizen 
representatives, their institutionalized thought structure tend to be less 
liberal than the thought structure of lower class citizen board 
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representatives in the community development program. As the data support 
the above argument, E.H.ll is accepted. 
Ascribed status and interaction 
G.H.12: The more superordinate the ascribed status, then the 
less the interaction. 
E.H.12: If Race Score is high, then Interaction Score will 
be low. 
The data support the hypothesized relationship between ascribed status 
(race) and interaction. The correlation coefficient was statistically sig-
2 
nificant and in the direction as hypothesized (r = -.37, P < .01). The R 
value of .15 indicates that 15 percent of variance in interaction is ac­
counted for by ascribed status. These findings suggest that white citizen 
representatives interact less in community development programs than the 
black citizen representatives. Conversely, black citizen representatives 
are more apt to be "active" in poverty programs as compared with whites. 
Again, these findings are consistent with a number of studies which have 
investigated interaction of minority and lower class individuals in com­
munity action programs (Kramer, 1969; Capps, 1970; Zurcher, 1970b; Warren, 
et al., 1974). 
Many of the federal poverty programs were instituted after the riots 
in the inner cities. The involvement of blacks in the structure of the 
poverty programs was by design (Seligman, 1968). The federal government 
mandated that minority group members be represented on the citizen boards 
and councils that set the policy or advised the general purpose governments 
on work plans (Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1969). Through 
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the participation in the civil right movement and the later involvement 
in the "Great Society" programs, black citizen representatives had a 
greater "identity investment" in such programs than the white citizen 
representatives. As the above argument was supported by the data, E.H.12 
was supported. 
Ascribed status and voluntary association membership 
G.H.13: The more superordinate the ascribed status, then the 
less the voluntary association membership. 
E.H.13: If Race Score is high, then Social Participation Score 
will be low. 
The data did not support the hypothesized relationship between ascribed 
status (race) and voluntary association membership. The correlation coef­
ficient (r = .09) was not statistically significant at the .05 level. In 
addition, ascribed status (race) explained only 1 percent of the variance 
in voluntary association membership. These findings indicate that race was 
not significantly related to social participation. That is, social partici­
pation rates for black and white citizen representatives did not differ 
statistically in this study. 
These findings do not conform to the "isolation thesis'* which suggests 
low social participation among blacks vis-a-vis whites (Campbell e^ , 
1960; Wright and Hyman, 1958; 1971). On the other hand, the findings do 
not fit the "compensation thesis" which suggests that blacks participate 
more actively than whites in a wider range of social and political organi­
zations (Babchuck and Booth, 1969; Drum, 1966; Renzi, 1968; Olsen, 1970; 
Ross and Wheeler, 1971). In addition the findings in this study do not 
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conform to the "ethnic community thesis" which suggests that members of 
an ethnic minority may become more "active" in social and political organ­
izations because of pressures exerted upon them within their ethnic com­
munity to conform to the norms of that community (Myrdal et , 1944; 
Lane, 1969; Olsen, 1970). 
The findings on ascribed status (race) and voluntary association 
membership indicate that there is no significant difference between 
black and white social participation rates. As the data do not support 
the hypothesized relationship, E.H.13 is rejected. 
Summary of two variable hypotheses 
The results of the regression analysis for the two variable hypotheses 
are summarized in Table 4.2. The table illustrates that three empirical 
hypotheses were not supported by the data (see E.H.3, E.H.5, and E.H.13). 
However, ten of the thirteen empirical hypotheses tested were statistically 
significant at the .05 probability level or better. The statistically 
significant relationships range from a weak correlation of .11 to a mod­
erately strong correlation of .60. These ten significant relationships 
represent a multi-variate approach in describing the relations in a com­
munity development program. Each of the ten relationships contributes to 
the building of a theoretical model of domain conflict. 
Below attention is focused on evaluating the six research variables 
in a path model. The purpose of this analysis was to assess the causal 
linkages between all the research variables in the theoretical model. It 
is the fundamental premise that the incorporation of a multi-variate model 
Table 4.2. Summary of regression analysis for the two-variable hypotheses 
Empirical 
Hypotheses 
(E.H.) 
Hypothesized relationship Standardized 
Regression 
Coefficient 
U p t i  
Value 
Result of 
Hypotheses 
Test 
E.H. 1 Liberalism - Domain Conflict .33 13.08** .11 Supported 
E.H. 2 Interaction - Domain Conflict .35 16.17** .12 Supported 
E.H. 3 Interaction - Liberalism .16 3.20 .01 Not Supported 
E.H. 4 Social Participation - Domain Conflict -.22 5.93* .05 Supported 
E.H. 5 Social Participation - Interaction -.11 1.46 .01 Not Supported 
E.H. 6 Social Position - Domain Conflict - . 2 9  10.22** .08 Supported 
E.H. 7 Social Position - Liberalism -.18 4.31* .03 Supported 
E.H. 8 Social Position - Interaction -.25 7.66** .06 Supported 
E.H. 9 Social Position - Social Participation . 60 65.00** .37 Supported 
E.H. 10 Race - Domain Conflict -.58 57.73** .34 Supported 
E.H. 11 Race - Liberalism -.58 57.90** .34 Supported 
E.H.12 Race - Interaction -.37 19.89** .15 Supported 
E.H.13 Race - Social Participation .09 0.94 .01 Not Supproted 
*F values significant at the .05 level, i.e., 3.93. 
**F values significant at the .01 level, i.e., 6.90. 
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of domain conflict solves the sociological problem of interpreting the 
meaning of the joint effect of many variables. 
Path Analysis and Evaluation of Paths in the Causal Model 
The conceptual causal model developed in Chapter II has been 
diagrammed in Figure 2.2, The technique of path analysis was used to 
assess the overall theoretical model of domain conflict. Path analysis 
displays a network of unidirectional relationships through arrows from 
explanatory variables to all variables from which a causal relationship 
is hypothesized (Wright, 1934; Duncan, 1966; Mulford e^ , 1972). 
In this section, the computation of partial regression and standard­
ized regression coefficients (path coefficients) for each path in the 
theoretical model were performed. The path model was tested for the "good­
ness of fit" within the data. 
The standardized regression coefficients or "path coefficients" are 
used to indicate the relative size of the relationship between the ex­
plained variables, when all other explanatory variables are taken into ac­
count. The null hypothesis for partial standardized regression coefficient 
(B = 0) was tested for each path coefficient using the .10 level. This 
procedure was used to evaluate whether or not the variables found in the 
recursive equations should remain in the equations. The findings of the 
relationships between the explanatory and explained variables in the path 
model are presented for all paths in Table 4.3. 
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Table 4.3. F values, path coefficients and percent variance explained (R ) 
in the path model of domain conflict 
Dependent and 
Indpendent Variables 
iipii 
Value 
Standardized 
Regression 
Coefficient 
(Path Coefficient) 
X_ - Social Participation 
- Race .02 
Xg - Social Position 63.01*** 
X, - Interaction 
- Race 16.59*** 
X^ - Social position 4.31** 
X^ - Social Participation .26 
X - Liberalism 
X^ - Race 55.10*** 
X^ - Social position 3.61** 
X. - Interaction 1.12 4 
X^ - Domain Conflict 
X^ - Race 25.18*** 
X^ - Social Position 1.32 
Xg - Social Participation 1.01 
X, - Interaction 2,03** 4 
X^ - Liberalism .02 
.36 
-.01 
. 6 0  
.35 
.22  
.05 
.61 
.18 
.08 
.50 
.11 
.09 
.12 
.01 
.18 
.38 
.39 
***F value significant at .01 level, i.e., 4.82. 
**F value significant at .05 level, i.e., 3.09. 
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Not all of the hypothesized causal relations predicted in the path 
model were statistically supported. However, seven of the thirteen causal 
relationships predicted in the model were statistically significant at the 
.10 level or better. Specifically, the Index of Social Position had a 
significant effect on social participation. However, race had only a 
negligible effect on the social participation variable. These findings 
suggest that social class is a better predictor of voluntary association 
membership than ascribed status. Ascribed status and social class acting 
jointly explained 36 percent of the variance in the voluntary associa­
tion membership variable. 
Two of the three paths that lead to the interaction variable were 
statistically significant. That is. Race (ascribed status) and social 
Position (class) had significant effects on interaction. The social par­
ticipation variable had a negligible effect on interaction. Although race 
and social position were both causally related to interaction. Race had 
the greater direct effect on the interaction variable. The three vari­
ables of Race, social position and social participation explained 18 per­
cent of the variance in the interaction variable. Thus, ascribed status 
and social class were causally related to interaction. 
Two of the three predicted paths that lead to the Liberalism variable 
were stistically significant. That is, Race and Social Position had a 
significant inverse causal relationship with Liberalism. However, the 
standardized regression coefficient for Race (-.35) had a greater rela­
tive effect than social position (-.22) on the liberalism variable. 
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Social participation had only minimal direct effect on liberalism. The 
above findings indicate that both ascribed status and social class have 
direct causal effects on institutionalized thought structure with ascribed 
status having the greater relative effect. 
Finally, five explanatory variables were specified in the model to 
have a causal linkage to domain conflict: Race, social position, social 
participation, interaction, and liberalism. The test of the model indi­
cates that only two variables had significant path coefficients leading to 
domain conflict. That is. Race (ascribed status) and interaction had sig­
nificant standardized regression coefficients of -.50 and .12, respective­
ly. By far. Race had the greater relative effect on domain conflict. The 
standardized regression coefficient for social position, social partici­
pation, and liberalism were not statistically significant at the .10 prob­
ability level. The path coefficient for Social Position (.11) was just 
under the cut-off point for statistically significant results. However, 
Social Position did have a significant indirect effect on domain conflict 
through the interaction variable. A path diagram of all the standardized 
regression coefficients is presented in Figure 4.1. 
The numbers in Figure 4.1 are the standardized regression coefficients 
or "path coefficients." By using the standardized path coefficients, one 
is able to see the relative amount of variance explained by the various 
explanatory variables. The diagram shows all paths (significant and non­
significant) in the causal model. The doubled-arrowed dashed line («#—»•) 
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between social participation and liberalism indicates that no hypothesized 
relationship was specified between these two variables in this study. 
Duncan (1965:7) has suggested the deletion of those standardized 
regression coefficients (path coefficients) which are not statistically 
significant. This procedure results in a modification of the path model 
and accompanying recursive equations representing the modified path model. 
The modified recursive equations are: 
^3 " ^3-2^2 ®3 
X4 = ^41.2^1 + ^ 42 .1^2 
^5 ^ ^51-2^1 ^52-1^2 + 
% = b61-34%l + b63'4%3 + ^ 64-3^4 + ^ 6 
New standardized regression coefficients were computed based on the 
above modified recursive equations. The findings of the relationships 
between the explanatory and explained variables are presented in Table 4.4 
and Figure 4.2. Again, the numbers placed on the arrows in the modified 
model represent the direct effects. Partial regression analysis was com­
puted, and all F-ratios for each regression coefficient were statistically 
significant. Thus, the arrows in Figure 4.2 represent only statistically 
significant paths in the model. A brief discussion of the findings based 
on the path analysis of the modified model is presented below. 
First, race and interaction have direct effects on domain conflict. 
The relative effects can be evaluated by conçaring their respective path 
coefficients presented in Table 4.4 and values placed on the arrows in the 
path diagram in Figure 4.2. 
.01 
.60 \.23 -.09 
.11 
.05 
-.50 
.01 
.12 
. 2 2  - . 0 8  
-.35 
Interaction 
Race X 
Liberalism X5 
Social Position Xg Domain Conflict Xg 
Social Participation X3 
Figure 4.1. Path model of domain conflict with all path coefficients presented 
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Table 4.4. F values, path coefficients and percent variance explained (R ) 
in the modified path model of domain conflict 
Explained and 
Explanatory Variables 
iipit 
Value 
Standardized 
Regression 
Coefficient 
(Path Coefficients) 
(Explained 
Variance) 
- Social Participation 
- Social Position 
X, - Interaction 4 
- Race 
X^ - Social Position 
X^ - Race 
Xg - Interaction 
65.00*** 
16.77*** 
4.92*** 
X^ - Liberalism 
X^ - Race 56.92*** 
X^ - Social Position 2.98* 
X^ - Domain Conflict 
o 
40.53*** 
3.40** 
. 6 0  
-.35 
- .20  
-.57 
-.16 
-.52 
.15 
.36 
.18 
.37 
.36 
***F values significant at .01 level. 
**F values significant at .05 level. 
*F values significant at .10 level. 
V23 
.78 
.15 
..79 
-.35 
.90 
Race X 
Liberalism X 
Interaction X 
:>oclal Position X 
Domain Conflict X 
Social Participation X 
Figure 4.2. Path model of domain conflict with all significant path coefficients presented. 
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Race (ascribed status) had a greater relative effect than interaction 
on domain conflict. The two explanatory variables have combined effects 
O 
in the prediction of domain conflict. The multiple partial R value was 
.36. This value means that race and interaction jointly explained 36 per­
cent of the variance in domain conflict. Thus, ascribed status (Race) and 
interaction can be seen as contributing to the prediction of domain con­
flict among citizen representatives in the community development program. 
Second, the modified path model suggests that social class (social 
position) and ascribed status (Race) had direct effects on the institu­
tionalized thought structure (Liberalism) among citizen representatives. 
The relative importance is evaluated through comparison of their respective 
path coefficients shown in Table 4.4 and values placed on the path diagram 
in Figure 4.2. The path coefficient for Race (-.57) had a greater rela­
tive effect than social position (-.16) on Liberalism. The impact of these 
two variables explained 37 percent of the variance in domain conflict. 
These findings suggest that while social class and ascribed status are im­
portant in predicting domain conflict, they are also important in predict­
ing institutionalized thought structure. The factors inpacting domain con­
flict indicates that race, social position and interaction each had relative 
magnitudes greater than liberalism. That is, institutionalized thought 
structure (liberalism) was not as important in determining domain conflict 
as were ascribed status, social class, and interaction. 
Third, race and social position have direct effects on interaction. 
The path coefficients found in Table 4.4 and in Figure 4.2 can be conpared 
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directly for their relative importance. The multiple was .18, meaning 
that 18 percent of the variance of interaction was explained by the two 
variables. Although the R value was not large, the two variables appear 
to affect the level of interaction among citizen representatives. That 
is, black and lower class citizens are more likely to have greater levels 
of interaction in the community development program as compared with white 
and middle class citizen representatives. These findings suggest that the 
design of the poverty programs has elicited the participation of the 
"under-class" and "disenfranchised" individuals. Interaction in the pov­
erty program is seen as one way of building a power base for these persons 
(Miller, 1965; Kramer, 1969). 
Fourth, Social Postion had a significant direct effect on social 
participation in voluntary associations. The value of .36 indicates 
that 36 percent of the variance of social participation was explained by 
the social position variable. Social class was the single most important 
factor in predicting voluntary association membership among citizen rep­
resentatives. The Race of the individual was not significant in deter­
mining organizational affiliation. Once the limiting effect of socio­
economic status was controlled, the social participation rates among 
black and white citizen representatives was statistically the same. Thus, 
social class can be seen as contributing to the explanation and predic­
tion of voluntary association membership. 
Finally, the overall evaluations of the causal model of predicting 
domain conflict indicate that three explanatory variables are significant 
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in this operation: ascribed status (race), social class (social position), 
and interaction. Specifically, Race and interaction had significant direct 
effects on domain conflict. Of the two variables. Race had a greater rela­
tive effect on domain conflict as compared with interaction. In addition. 
Race and social position had significant indirect effects on domain con­
flict through the interaction variable. Again, Race had a greater rela­
tive indirect effect than social position. 
Although institutionalized thought structure was significantly 
related to domain conflict in the test of the two variable hypothesis, it 
was of less importance in determining domain conflict when the variables 
of ascribed status, social class and interaction were considered in a 
causal model. This finding points out the utility of a multi-variate 
model of describing domain conflict. While the use of bivariate hypothe­
ses are useful in describing relationships, the causal model (path model) 
allows one to go a step further in delineating the networks and linkage of 
variables in the empirical arena. 
In summary, this chapter has presented the study of the chapter 
findings. The two variable hypotheses have been delineated and the tests 
and evaluations of the causal model have been made. In the chapter to 
follow, a discussion of the implications of the study findings is 
presented. 
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CHAPTER V. IMPLICATIONS 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to indicate implications of the study 
findings for the following areas: (1) social theory, and (2) social 
policy. A major goal of social theory is to offer explanations and pre­
diction of social phenomena. In looking at citizen board representatives 
as the empirical referrant, an attempt was made to offer a theoretical 
framework in which to explain and predict domain conflict in a community 
development program. In addition, the study focused on the interrelation­
ships among the variables under investigation. The findings of this study 
also have implications for social policy and practices in urban reform. 
Community development planners and decision makers may discover that the 
study findings are useful in developing and/or evaluating participation of 
citizens in urban community organizations. 
Implications for Social Theory 
The research problem of explaining and predicting domain conflict 
among citizen board representatives in a community development program has 
been explored through a multivariate concept of domain conflict developed 
from the literature. Five major factors were distilled from the litera­
ture as causally linked to domain conflict: namely, institutionalized 
thought structure, interaction, voluntary association membership, social 
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class, and ascribed status (race). It was also posited that the five 
explanatory variables are causally related. 
The conceptual framework of this study was grounded on past theory 
and research literature focused on voluntary associations, community action, 
and interest-group studies. This study was exploratory in terms of test­
ing a "new" theoretical or causal model of domain conflict in a community 
development program. The theoretical implications of the study are pre­
sented below. 
1. The theoretical framework for understanding and predicting domain 
conflict can be accomplished by focusing on three major theoretical con­
cepts: namely, ascribed status (race), social class, and interaction 
(formal and informal interaction). Ascribed status (race) and interaction 
have direct causal effects on domain conflict. Social class, on the other 
hand, has an indirect effect on domain conflict through the intervening 
variable of interaction. 
Specifically, white citizen board representatives expressed lower 
levels of domain conflict than black citizen board representatives in the 
community development program. Individuals who were the most "active" in 
the formal and informal structure of the community development program 
expressed greater levels of domain conflict as compared with members who 
interacted infrequently in the program. Two factors were important in 
determining the degree of interaction among citizen representatives: name­
ly, race and social position. Interaction was greatest among the black and 
lower class citizen representatives. 
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2. In presenting the interrelationships between the explanatory 
variables, this study lends support to the "interest-group" theories that 
hold that social class and ethnicity are prime determinants of "conscious­
ness" (Marx and Engels, 1906; 1961; Mannheim, 1936; Centers, 1949; Lane, 
1969; Jackman and Jackman, 1973). That is, social position and race had 
direct causal effects on the degree of liberalism concerning government 
intervention in the area of poverty. The relative magnitude of the vari­
ables showed that race had a greater effect on the citizen representative's 
thought structure than the representative's social position. Jackman and 
Jackman (1973) insist that the black-white ethnic cleavage in the United 
States represents the most salient ethnic cleavage in contemporary America. 
Blacks and whites do not act as one group in their personal development of 
institutionalized thought structures. The civil rights movement of the 
fifties and sixties, along with the "Black Power" movement were essential 
ingredients in raising the "ego-involvement" and conciousness among blacks 
in the United States (Kramer, 1969; Hamilton, 1974; Lowi, 1969). Par­
ticipation in the "War on Poverty" and "Great Society" programs had the 
effect of politicizing traditionally disenfranchised individuals as demon­
strated by their proposals for "radical" solutions (e.g., structural 
change, re-distribution of power and wealth) to the problem of poverty 
(Kramer, 1969; Lowi, 1969; Peterson, 1970; Warren, 1974a; Edelman, 1975). 
Thus, membership in an "underdog" class (e.g., ethnic minority, lower 
class) causes citizen representatives to have liberal-humanitarian thought 
structures. 
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The interest-group approach enables a direct evaluation of the 
variables that impact domain conflict within an organization where members 
compete for scarce resources and have divergent epistemologies (Glenn et 
al., 1970; Zechmeister and Druckman, 1973). Considering the argument that 
federal poverty programs were designed with a variety of latent and mani­
fest goals in mind, it is no small wonder domain conflicts existed among 
the various program participants. However, the causal factors involved in 
domain conflict have not been systematically examined in a causal model 
framework in previous empirical research studies. In this study, the 
interest-group approach proved useful in illuminating the interrelation­
ship of variables operating in a community development program. 
3. Since community development programs represent only one type of 
organizations where individuals interact, it would appear fruitful to use 
the concepts, hypotheses, and causal model in the study of other organi­
zational settings that have advisory boards or councils (i.e., school 
systems, social welfare agencies, health organizations). Again, it should 
be noted that one of the objectives of this study was to explore the inter­
relationships of variables in a causal model framework. This objective 
was accomplished through the use of the technique of path analysis. Here, 
significant relationships were built into a causal model. Path analysis 
provided the relative path magnitude so that comparisons of the direct ef­
fect of variables could be made and the path coefficients which were not 
statistically significant could be deleted from the causal model. Thus, 
in presenting key variables in a path model, one is better able to 
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understand the interrelatedness of concepts operating together, and to 
specify the relative effect of explanatory variables on the explained 
variable. 
4. The findings on social participation in voluntary associations 
suggest that social class was causally related to organizational affilia­
tion. That is, the higher the social class, the greater the voluntary 
association membership. These findings are consistent with the theoreti­
cal literature reviewed on socioeconomic background and organizational 
affiliation (Campbell et al., 1960; Tomeh, 1969; Phillips, 1969; Wright 
and Hyman, 1971; Crenson, 1974). However, ethnicity (race) was not a 
significant factor in determining organization affiliation in this study. 
This finding is contrary to the "isolation thesis" (Wright and Hyman, 
1971), the "compensation thesis" (Myrdal £t , 1944; Babchuk and Booth, 
1969; Orum, 1966; Renzi, 1968; Ross and Wheeler, 1971), and the "ethnic 
community thesis" (Lane, 1969; Olsen, 1970; Williams and Babchuk, 1973). 
Thus, the findings of this study suggest that once the limiting effect of 
social class has been controlled, black and white participation in volun­
tary associations is essentially the same. 
5. A limitation of the theory used in ihis study concerns the 
additional explanatory variables that might have been predictive of the 
explained variable but were not used. However, as this study was explana­
tory in nature, a few explanatory variables were developed from the litera­
ture as key factors that might affect domain conflict. There are several 
other areas that could be developed for future research in an organization­
al setting: (1) need for more general theoretical inputs in terms of 
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development of concepts, models and theory in this area, (2) application 
of multi-variate approaches in analyzing community programs, (3) use of 
other organizations in addition to replicating with community development 
organizations, and (4) longitudinal study of community development 
organizations. 
In summary, it is suggested that the empirical findings of this study 
contribute to the advancement of a theoretical model of predicting and 
understanding domain conflict in a community development program, and the 
interrelationships of variables that operate in the organization setting 
of a community program. This model may also be applicable to other formal 
organizations as well as the study of domain conflicts that may emerge at 
the neighborhood or community level. 
Implications for Social Policy 
Stenberg (1972) has posited that much of the public administrative 
policy and practices of governmental agencies run counter to the principles 
of citizen participation. This problem is compunded when citizen repre­
sentatives are clients, lower class, minority, uneducated, or demand a 
decision making position in the organizational hierarchy. Thus, Stenberg 
(1972) concludes that there is an inherent conflict between lower class 
member's involvement and the middle class values that are prevalent in both 
the bureaucratic structure and traditional principles of "professionalism" 
found in American administrative policy. 
Lower class and minority group members are more apt to suggest more 
"radical" departures for community programming than middle class or 
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superordinate group members (whites). Policy makers should be willing to 
accept the idea that plans and programs developed with citizens will re­
flect the values, interests, and needs of neighborhood residents and may 
sometimes conflict with administrative policy and professional doctrine 
(Lowenstein, 1971). 
The findings in this study tend to confirm the argument posited by 
Peterson (1970) who asserted that opportunities for domain conflicts are 
increased in community development organizations where racial factionalism 
is apparent, and where black and white citizen representatives oppose each 
other over the allocation of resources. Silberman (1968) has argued that 
racial coalitions (e.g., black-white) may find it difficult to arrive at 
a consensus on politically volatile issues. In the case of the community 
development program, resource allocation and citizen participation are two 
focal issues where conflicts are prevalent (Peterson, 1970; Capps, 1970; 
Warren £t al., 1974); Edelman, 1975). 
Several key causal factors were delineated as significant in the 
prediction and explanation of domain conflict among citizen representa­
tives: namely, race, social position, and interaction. These three con­
cepts were shown to be the most efficient variables in this study for ex­
plaining domain conflict. Specifically, the direction of the relation­
ships were as follows: (1) blacks expressed a greater level of domain 
conflict than whites, (2) blacks interacted more often in the community 
development program than whites, (3) lower class members interacted more 
often than middle class members, and (4) "high" interaction members 
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expressed a greater level of domain conflict than "low" interaction 
members. These findings indicate that race and interaction have direct 
effects on the level of domain conflict expressed by citizen representa­
tives. On the other hand, social position (social class) has an indirect 
effect on domain conflict through the intervening variable of interaction. 
Institutionalized thought structure (the degree of liberalism toward 
government intervention in the area of poverty) and domain conflict were 
not causally related in the path model. However, the test of the bivariate 
hypothesis showed a statistically significant relationship. When the lib­
eralism variable was inserted into the causal model along with the other 
explanatory variables, the relative effect of the liberalism variable was 
not statistically significant. This finding suggests that race, social 
position, and interaction are the key factors in determining domain con­
flict among citizen representatives, while liberalism has only a negligi­
ble effect on domain conflict in community programming. 
Finally, the results obtained from this study may prove useful to 
policy makers in their re-thinking of community programs. That is, most 
of the federally sponsored community development programs were designed 
based on a "consensus model" where emphasis was placed on integrating 
minority and lower class citizen into the middle class way of life. In 
addition, participation by the poor in federal poverty programs was viewed 
as an opportunity for the poor to learn skills and acquire motivation com­
parable to that of the middle class (Moynihan, 1965; Miller, 1965; Arn-
stein, 1969; Harmon, 1970; Capps, 1970). 
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The findings of this study have shown that the "consensus model" may 
not be the appropriate framework to use in understanding and explaining 
the relationships that develop among citizen representatives in a communi­
ty development program. This may be particularly the case where federally 
mandated "citizen participation" requirements are in effect. Under such 
circumstances, lower class and minority group members (e.g., blacks and 
other ethnic minorities) are included in the advisory board and councils. 
Through the delineation of key variables such as race, social position and 
interaction patterns, one is better able to understand the end product of 
the joint effect of these variables in a community development program: 
namely, domain conflict. 
107 
CHAPTER VI. SUMMARY 
The procedure in this chapter is to review and assess research 
findings related on each of the objectives of the study. This disserta­
tion is an attempt to examine domain conflict in a community development 
program by using the citizen board representatives as the empirical refer-
rant. As stated at the outset, the five objectives of this study are: 
(1) to develop and test a model of domain conflict among citizen repre­
sentatives in a community development board; (2) to test and delineate 
more clearly the relationships between key explanatory concepts (i.e., 
institutionalized thought structure, interaction, voluntary association 
membership, social class, and ascribed status) and the key explained con­
cept of domain conflict; (3) to gain more insight into the issues sur­
rounding lower class minority group member (e.g., black) participation in 
community and other voluntary associations; (4) to delineate some of the 
policy implications of city-wide citizen participation structures; and 
(5) to develop an indicator of domain conflict which reflects both the 
material as well as the ideological nature of the concept. 
In Chapter II, the conceptual causal model explaining domain conflict 
was presented. Five major explanatory variables were distilled from the 
literature as causal factors of domain conflict: institutionalized 
thought structure, interaction, voluntary association membership, social 
class, and ascribed status. The theoretical framework was developed from 
voluntary association, community action, and social conflict literature 
and studies. Based on these perspectives, n causal framework was 
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formulated for the analysis of domain conflict in a community development 
program. Following the lead of Glenn £t (1970), domain conflict was 
conceptualized as being comprised of two components: conflict of interest 
and conflict of understanding. In an attempt to capture both of these 
aspects in a holistic approach in the community development program, a 
composite conceptualization of domain conflict was employed. 
Another major focal concern in the theoretical chapter is the 
formulation of the explanatory concepts. Here, explanatory concepts were 
those variables which were posited as causal or determinants of domain con­
flict. First, bivariate hypotheses were formulated based on a review of 
previous studies. Thirteen general hypotheses (G.H.) were delineated. 
These hypotheses are restated below: 
G.H. 1: The more liberal the institutionalized thought structure, 
then the greater the domain conflict. 
G.H. 2: The greater the interaction, then the greater the domain 
conflict. 
G.H. 3: The greater the interaction, then the more liberal the 
institutionalized thought structure. 
G.H. 4: The greater the voluntary association membership, then the 
less the domain conflict. 
G.H. 5: The greater the voluntary association membership, then the 
less the interaction. 
G.H. 5: The higher the social class, then the less the domain 
conflict. 
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G.H. 7: The higher the social class, then the less liberal the 
institutionalized thought structure. 
G.H. 8: The higher the social class, then the less the interaction. 
G.H. 9: The higher the social class, then the greater the voluntary-
association membership. 
G.H. 10: The more superordinate the ascribed status, then the less 
the domain conflict. 
G.H. 11: The more superordinate the ascribed status, then the less 
liberal the institutionalized thought structure. 
G.H. 12: The more superordinate the ascribed status, then the less 
the interaction. 
G.H. 13: The more superordinate the ascribed status, then the less 
the voluntary association membership. 
Following the two variable hypotheses, the path model of domain 
conflict was developed. The same six concepts used in the two variable 
analysis were also specified in the path model presented in Figure 2.2. 
In the chapter on methodology. Chapter III, the sample of citizen 
board representatives in a local community development program was de­
scribed. This sample provided the data for testing the hypotheses and 
evaluating the conceptual causal model. The data were collected by means 
of mailed questionnaires and structured interviews conducted during Au­
gust and September, 1975. 
Each of the six concepts delineated in the theoretical discussion was 
operationalized and empirically measured. For each of the thirteen general 
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hypotheses, an empirical hypothesis was delineated. The statistical 
technique used to test the bivariate relationships of the empirical hy­
potheses was regression analysis. The .05 level of probability was used 
to assess statistically significant relationships. 
For the path model, the same six concepts previously delineated were 
linked in a causal framework, with domain conflict being the last variable 
to enter the model. The statistical technique used to evaluate paths in 
the model was partial regression analysis. 
In Chapter IV, the results of the bivariate relationships and the 
path model were presented. With regard to the two variable hypotheses, 
ten of the thirteen empirical relationships were significantly supported 
by the data. A brief summary of each of the bivariate relationships is 
presented in Table 5.1. 
For the test of significance for path coefficients, the F values and 
standardized regression coefficients for the hypothesized paths in the 
path model were computed and presented in Figure 4.1 and Table 4.3. Seven 
of the thirteen hypothesized paths were statistically significant. The 
non-significant paths were deleted from the causal model. The remaining 
paths were recomputed which resulted in a modified path model. These 
findings are presented in Table 4.4 and the path diagram is shown in 
Figure 4.2. A brief summary of the findings of the modified path model is 
presented as follows: 
1. Both ascribed status (race) and interaction contribute signifi­
cantly to the prediction of domain conflict. However, race seems to be a 
Table 6.1. Summary o£ regression analysis for the two-variable hypotheses 
Empirical 
Hypotheses 
(E.H.) 
Hypothesized Relationship Standardized 
Regression 
Coefficient 
Ilpll 
Value 
R2 Result of 
Hypotheses 
Test 
E.H. 1 Liberalism - Domain Conflict .33 13.08** .11 Supported 
E.H. 2 Interaction - Domain Conflict .35 16.17** .12 Supported 
E.H. 3 Interaction - Liberalism .16 3.20 .01 Not Supported 
E.H. 4 Social Participation - Domain Conflict -.22 5.93* .05 Supported 
E.H. 5 Social Participation - Interaction -.11 1.46 .01 Not Supported 
E.H. 6 Social Position - Domain Conflict -.29 10.22** .08 Supported 
E.H. 7 Social Position - Liberalism -.18 4.31* .03 Supported 
E.H. 8 Social Position - Interaction -.25 7.66** .06 Supported 
E.H. 9 Social Position - Social Participation .60 65.00** .37 Supported 
E.H. 10 Race - Domain Conflict -.58 57.73** .34 Supported 
E.H. 11 Race - Liberalism -.58 57.90** .34 Supported 
E.H. 12 Race - Interaction -.37 19.89** .15 Supported 
E.H. 13 Race - Social Participation .09 0.94 .01 Not Supported 
*F value significant at the .05 level, i.e., 3.93. 
**¥ value significant at the .01 level, i.e., 6.90. 
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stronger predictor of domain conflict than interaction. Together these 
two variables account for 36 percent of the variance in the domain conflict 
variable. 
2. Social class has a significant indirect effect on domain conflict 
through interaction. In addition, ascribed status (race) was causally re­
lated to interaction. Social class and ascribed status explained 18 per­
cent of the variance in interaction, with ascribed status having a greater 
relative effect on interaction than social class. 
3. Both paths from ascribed status and social class to institution­
alized thought structure are significant. These two variables explained 
37 percent of the variance in the institutionalized thought structure vari­
able. Thus, these findings suggest that ethnicity and socioeconomic status 
are significant factors in shaping the attitudes that citizen representa­
tives have toward federal poverty intervention programming. 
4. Social class has a direct causal effect on voluntary association 
membership. That is, social class appears to contribute significantly to 
the explanation and prediction of organizational affiliation among the 
citizen representatives. Here, middle class citizen representatives were 
more likely to be affiliated with outside organizations (organizations 
external to the community development program) than lower class citizen 
representatives. The single variable of social class explained 36 percent 
of the variance in voluntary association membership. Thus, social class 
seems to be the single most important variable in explaining organization­
al affiliation in this study. 
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In Chapter IV, the implications of the research study were delineated 
in terms of theoretical and policy implications. The theoretical model of 
domain conflict appears useful in explanation and prediction of domain con­
flict in an organizational setting. Three key variables were important in 
explaining domain conflict: namely, ascribed status (race), interaction, 
and social class. 
The findings of this study support the "interest-group" theories 
where social class and ethnicity are seen as determinants of "conscious­
ness" (Marx and Engels, 1906; 1961; Mannheim, 1936; Centers, 1949; Lane, 
1969; Jackman and Jackman, 1973). Class and ethnic cleavages are seen as 
major causal factors of an individual's institutionalized thought structure. 
Participation in the "War on Poverty" and "Great Society" programs seems 
to have politicized traditionally disenfranchised individuals (e.g., the 
poor, ethnic minorities) as demonstrated through their liberal-humanitari­
an thought structures on poverty intervention (Kramer, 1969; Lowi, 1969) . 
The findings on voluntary association membership and social class 
were consistent with the literature reviewed. That is, middle class mem­
bers were more likely to be affiliated with voluntary associations than 
were lower class members. However, race was not a significant factor in 
determining organizational affiliation. Once the limiting factor of 
social class was eliminated or controlled, it seems that black and white 
participation in voluntary associations was essentially the same. This 
finding was contrary to Wright and Hyman's (1971) "isolation thesis," the 
"compensation thesis" (Myrdal et al., 1944; Babchuk and Booth, 1969; Orum, 
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1966; Renzi, 1968; Ross and Wheeler, 1971), and the "ethnic community 
thesis" (Lane, 1969; Olsen, 1970; Williams and Babchuk, 1973). Thus, 
social class seems to be a crucial factor in explaining voluntary associ­
ation membership. 
In terms of the implications for social policy, it was pointed out 
that the findings in this study confirm the argument that domain conflicts 
are likely in community organizations where black and white citizen rep­
resentatives oppose each other over the allocation of resources (Peterson, 
1970). In addition, the study findings indicate that lower class and 
minority group members (e.g., blacks) are more apt to propose more "radi­
cal" solutions to the problem of poverty than middle class or superordinate 
group members (e.g., whites). In turn, policy makers should be aware that 
plans and programs developed by lower class and racial minorities will re­
flect the values, interests, and "needs" of these groups and may sometime 
conflict with administrative policy and professional doctrine. Stenberg 
(1972) asserts that much of the public administrative policy and practices 
of governmental agencies run counter to the principles of citizen partici­
pation. This problem is compunded when members happen to be clients, lower 
class, minority, or demand a decision making role in the organizational 
hierarchy. 
It was demonstrated that blacks, lower class members, and members who 
interact frequently with other citizen board members expressed greater 
levels of domain conflict as compared to whites, middles members, and mem­
bers who interacted infrequently with other citizen board representatives. 
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Institutionalized thought structure was not a major causal factor of 
domain conflict among citizen representatives. That is, a significant 
positive relationship was found between liberalism and domain conflict in 
the test of the bivariate hypothesis. However, when the relationship was 
analyzed in a causal model framework, liberalism was not as. significant 
as race, interaction, and social position in determining domain conflict. 
Thus, race, social position, and interaction are key factors in explaining 
domain conflict in a community development program. 
Finally, it seems that a multi-variate approach in explaining domain 
conflict is useful in presenting the key variables that operate jointly 
in an urban community organization. This approach allows one to show the 
mutual effects of the causal factors along with the relative magnitude of 
each variable on domain conflict. Thus, the multi-variate approach seems 
to be a useful framework for describing and explaining the interrelation­
ship of key elements that exist in a community organization. 
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Table A.l. Distribution of occupation 
Category Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Frequency 
Laborer, Farm 20 17.4 20 
Service Work, Semi-skill 14 12.2 34 
Skilled Manual, Craftsman 16 13.9 50 
Skilled Manual 24 20.9 74 
Clerical, Sales 19 16.5 • 93 
Admin. Personnel 22 19.1 115 
Table A.2. Distribution of education 
Category Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Frequency 
0-8 years 3 2.6 3 
9-11 years 7 6.1 10 
High School Graduate 6 5.2 16 
Some College 35 30.4 51 
College Graduate 40 34.8 91 
Work After BA/BS 19 16.5 110 
Advanced Degree 5 4.4 115 
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Table A.3. Distribution of sex 
Category Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Frequency 
Male 65 56.5 65 
Female 50 43.5 115 
Table A.4. Distribution of income 
Range Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Frequency 
$ 1,000 - 4,999 15 13.0 15 
5,000 - 8,999 38 33.0 53 
9,000 - 12,999 27 23.6 80 
13,000 - 16,999 23 20.0 103 
17,000 - 20,999 5 4.3 108 
21,000 - 24,999 5 4.3 113 
25,000 and over 2 1.8 115 
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The questions that follow the instructions below are those selected 
for analysis in this dissertation. 
The following questionnaire contains a number of statements on 
citizen participation for which there is no general agreement. The pur­
pose of these statements is to give the Board members a chance to evaluate 
citizen participation in the Neighborhood Development Program. There are 
no right or wrong answers. NO ONE WILL BE SINGLED OUT BY NAME OR OTHER 
IDENTIFYING FACTOR in compiling the total evaluation which Board members 
will be making. We would like your honest opinions on each of these 
statements. 
1. The following statements are things sometimes heard about participa­
tion by people in community development programs, particularly in 
planning such programs. In each of the below items, please indicate 
whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree 
with the statements as they may apply to citizen participation in 
the Neighborhood Development Program. 
SA A D SD a. Citizen participation makes for a more effective Neighbor­
hood Development Program. 
SA A D SD b. Citizen participation has improved the relations between 
people in the Neighborhood Development neighborhoods. 
SA A D SD c. Citizen participation is just another way of "using" the 
residents in the neighborhood. 
SA A D SD d. Citizen participation helps people feel a part of the 
neighborhood. 
SA A D SD e. Citizen participation provides an opportunity for residents 
to speak, but without being heard. 
SA A D SD f. Citizens are often frustrated from the lack of input into 
the decision-making processes of the program. 
SA A D SD g. Citizen participation in the Neighborhood Development Pro­
gram is really causing less exploitation of the residents. 
SA A D SD h. Citizen participation has generated special interest groups 
that are competing for limited resources in the neighborhoods. 
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SA A D SD i. Citizen participation is nothing more than a gimmick since 
the residents have not been given any real power. 
SA A D SD j. Citizen participation has contributed to an increased class 
consciousness among neighborhood residents. 
2. In thinking about the funds coming into Des Moines for community 
development programs, would you say that such funds are equally or 
unequally distributed across the six Neighborhood Development 
neighborhoods? 
Equally distributed 
Unequally distributed 
3. Do you feel that this neighborhood (NEIGHBORHOOD MEMBER REPRESENTS) 
has received its fair share of funds from the Neighborhood Develop­
ment Program? 
Yes 
No 
4. What is your feeling on the impact of programs provided through 
Neighborhood Development, in general, would you say that the programs 
have caused greater or less competition among residents of the 
neighborhoods? 
Less competition 
Greater competition 
5. How many really close friends do you have on this Board (NEIGHBORHOOD 
BOARD MEMBER REPRESENTS) that you occasionally talk over confidential 
matters with? 
None or one 
Two or more 
6. How often do you get to visit the friend(s) that you know best on this 
Board? 
Once a month or less 
More than once a month 
140 
Would you say that you go around with a certain group of close friends 
on this Board who visit back and forth in each other's houses? 
No 
Yes 
About how many Neighborhood Development Board meetings a month would 
you say you have attended on the average or over the past six 
months? 
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The questions that follow the instructions below are those selected 
for analysis in this dissertation. 
CONFIDENTIAL 
Schedule Number Name of Respondent 
Date Time 
Hello! My name is . I am conducting a study 
of citizen participation in the Neighborhood Development Program. The 
purpose of the interviews is to give each Neighborhood Priority and Cen­
tral Advisory Board member a chance to evaluate citizen participation in 
the present program. The goal is to put all the Citizen Board member's 
opinions together to form a total evaluation of citizen participation. 
YOUR NAME WILL NOT BE USED IN CONNECTION WITH YOUR ANSWERS. Thus, all 
board members will be asked about citizen participation as it relates to 
residents, other Board members, and to service delivery. 
As a board member in Neighborhood Development, your cooperation in contrib­
uting to the evaluation is important in the development of future models 
of community programs. 
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1. As you know, the Neighborhood Development Program is funded through a 
grant from the federal government (Department of Housing and Urban 
Development). Because of this tie with the federal government, 
please give us your opinion of government programs in general by indi­
cating whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly dis­
agree with the following statements. (HAND CARD 1). 
SA A D SD a. Government programs have not gone far enough to eliminate 
poverty in this country. 
SA A D SD b. Government programs create dependent classes of people. 
SA A D SD c. Government programs kill the spirit of individualism which 
made this country great. 
SA A D SD d. Government programs have strengthened the economic and 
social institutions in this country. 
SA A D SD e. Most people deserve the benefits they receive from Govern­
ment programs. 
SA A D SD f. Government programs have grown in size to the point of 
being unmanageable. 
2. Are you a member of other voluntary and/or community organizations 
other than the Neighborhood Development Board(s)? 
No 
Yes 2a. (IF RESPONDENT ANSWERED YES) Please list 
the organizations you belong to, and how 
active you are in them whether they are 
in Des Moines or elsewhere (HAND R FORM 
INSERT) 
2b. (RECORD THE ACTUAL NUMBER OF MEMBERSHIP 
ORGANIZATIONS; IF ANSWERED ENTER 0) 
Number 
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Name of 
Organization 
Do you 
attend 
meetings 
regularly? 
Do you pay 
dues or 
give con­
tributions? 
Are yqu a 
member of 
any com­
mittees? 
Are you 
an 
officer? 
Yes ' No 
i 
Yes ' No 
i 
Yes ' No 
1 
Yes t No 
1 
( 1 
1 
1 I t 
1 
( 1 
1 
1 1 
J 
1 1 
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1 
1 I 
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1 
I 
i 
I 
1 
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1 
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! 
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1 
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1 1 
1 
i 
1 
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1 
! 1 1 I \ 
1 1 
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! 
1 5 I 1 
1 
1 
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How many years of education have you completed? What is the 
highest degree completed? 
What is your occupation (specific job title and description of job)? 
One item generally thought to be a good measure of social status is 
income. Thus, in which category does the total income in your house­
hold for the past year fall? (HAND R CARD) 
01 less than $1,000 
02 $1,000 to $1,999 
03 $2,000 to $2,999 
04 $3,000 to $3,999 
05 $4,000 to $4,999 
06 $5,000 to $5,999 
Respondent's Sex 
1 Male 2 
Respondent's Race 
1 Black 2 
Female 
07 
08 
09 
10 
11 
$6,000 to $8,999 
$9,000 to $11,999 
$12,000 to $14,999 
$15,000 to $24,999 
$25,000 or more 
White Other 
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The citizen representatives who were the empirical referrants for 
this study were either elected or appointed to one year terms on the 
respective community boards. Representatives came from six "Prime Service 
Areas" from the research city. 
At the time that this research study was being conducted, there were 
no raging controversies or conflicts within the program. The ranking of 
service projects and allocation of resources based on priorities had been 
completed six months prior to the interviewing. Board meetings were fairly 
routine and predictable in terms of citizen demands. 
Although the citizen participation component of the Neighborhood 
Development Program had been reduced from the early "key days" of 1971-1972, 
the city still has a sizable budget for citizen participation. The top 
administrators in the program often point to this fact that the program 
has decentralized offices in six neighborhoods. These decentralized offices 
have staffs and an operating budget. Neighborhood meetings and other pro­
gram functions are held in the site offices. 
The site area coordinators of each "target area" are responsible for 
disseminating information on citizen participation and community involve­
ment. As the Service Area Coordinators were familiar with the citizen 
representatives of these respective neighborhoods, they were useful in 
making telephone follow-ups to respondents and in scheduling interviews. 
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The citizen representatives have the responsibility of ranking and 
prioritizing the service areas or goals of the program. This ranking 
process starts from the community residents and continues through the 
Neighborhood Priority Boards, Central Advisory Board, and then to the 
City Council. These processes had been completed long before this study 
began. 
Thus, although there appeared to be some differences in terms of 
neighborhood "needs" and priorities advocated by citizen representatives, 
these differences did not manifest themselves into open confrontations 
and hostilities. 
